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This research project examines the intervening role of party system 
institutionalization in determining the effect of electoral rules on the behavior of political 
parties. Highly institutionalized systems differ across multiple dimensions—supply 
stability, volatility of results, and rootedness of parties—from fluid systems. Party 
behavior can be depicted rationally as a response to both institutional incentives and the 
historical and sociological context of a nation’s party system. Electoral incentives 
promoting certain types of party behavior can be negated by party system mechanics that 
deter those behaviors. The research uses a medium-N structured, focused comparison of 
elections from Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea held under preference voting rules, 
a majority formula that rewards parties for cooperating formally prior to elections. 
Preference voting is assumed to offer a middle ground between the problems of 
concentration inherent to single member district plurality systems and the problems of 
coordination necessitated by multi-member district list PR models. Despite similar 
incentives, the cases differ in the type and number of pre-electoral alliances. Using party 
system institutionalization as an intervening variable, the thesis constructs a heuristic 
model to assess whether cooperation is likely in preference voting systems.  
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Chapter One: Party System Institutionalization and Strategic Behavior 
  
This research project examines the intervening role of party system 
institutionalization in determining the effect of electoral rules on the behavior of political 
parties. An intriguing line of scholarship contends that democratic party systems have 
varying levels of institutionalization, which could potentially explain diversity in party 
behavior under virtually identical electoral systems. The principle logic presented in this 
paper is that party behavior can be depicted rationally as a response to both electoral 
incentives and the contextual specifics of a nation’s party system. Looking only at 
electoral rules obscures potentially competing incentives in the party system that 
ultimately muddle the ability to predict party behavior. I suggest that electoral incentives 
promoting certain types of party behavior could be negated by party system mechanics 
that deter those behaviors.  
 In the last century, there is a lengthy history of democratic nations changing their 
electoral rules in an effort to stimulate different political party behavior (Norris, 2004). 
The ensuing research focuses specifically on preference voting, an electoral system that is 
said to foster cooperative party behavior. Australia, Ireland, Sri Lanka, Papua New 
Guinea, and Fiji have all used preference voting for national elections. The system is also 
common in regional and local elections in the United States, Australia, and throughout 
Europe (Reilly, 1997A).  
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Under preference voting, individual voters rank candidates in their preferred 
order. The mechanism through which cooperation unfolds is alliance formation between 
parties, particularly prior to elections. In districts without an outright majority winner on 
the initial count, preferential voting’s redistribution rewards parties that reliably obtain 
second preferences from a different party’s supporters. Parties therefore are incentivized 
to seek out potential partners with which to exchange second preferences through formal 
alliances.  
 This study examines the potentially interactive effects of preferential voting and 
the institutionalization of the party system on alliance formation prior to elections. The 
analysis covers eight elections from Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. The 
departure point emerges from differences concerning alliance formation among the three 
countries. In Australia, the major parties have formed alliances along the same lines for 
multiple electoral cycles. In Fiji, the two most successful parties consistently formed 
alliances against each other, but their minor partners changed frequently. In Papua New 
Guinea, formal alliances as such have not occurred at all and pre-electoral collaboration 
has been sporadic at best.  
Using recent scholarship on how to assess the relative levels of institutionalization 
of democratic party systems, this study attempts to unpack distinctions between the 
straightforward causal mechanisms at work in the Australian case and the increasingly 
complex and occasionally contradictory causal mechanisms in Fiji and Papua New 
Guinea respectively. By incorporating party system variation into a rational choice 
framework, the research provides a heuristic for how specific contextual and institutional 
arrays could either highlight or obscure the cooperative incentives of preference voting.  
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Fluid party systems possess barriers for pre-electoral cooperation that might be 
difficult to surmount. First, in these contexts, stability of party supply is low while 
volatility of election results is high. Therefore, as the following research will hypothesize, 
parties might not accurately be able to determine their own standing among the 
electorate, nor might they reasonably be able to predict the standing of potential allies or 
presumed competitors. Secondly, fluid party systems typically feature elites who behave 
independent of the party system. When independent candidates are successful, and 
individual politicians are not beholden to the parties under whose banners they are 
elected, then the multi-district aggregation of interests that is necessary for formal 
alliances of preference trading is not present. Reciprocity does not appeal when the 
individual trumps the party. 
Preferential Voting Systems 
Preferential voting, also known as instant run-off voting, is a majoritarian system 
that requires winning candidates to earn 50 percent plus one of the overall votes. 
Following Australian custom, preferential voting is often given the proper title of the 
Alternative Vote (AV).1 It is most commonly, but not exclusively, used in single member 
districts. Preference voting offers a middle ground between the two electoral extremes of 
proportional list PR and plurality first past the post (FPTP) systems. Similarly to FPTP 
models, preference voting awards only one winner per district. At the aggregate level, 
therefore, the majoritarian preference voting system will disproportionately reward the 
most popular parties with seats in the government. However, similarly to list PR, 
                                                




preference voting allows for less popular parties to have a say in the final outcome. While 
they do not necessarily earn seats in the government, minor parties can influence the 
results in some districts through the redistribution of their votes in the mathematical 
process required to reach the winning threshold.  
The intricacy of preference voting is in how the winning threshold is reached. 
Voters assign preferences to each candidate, ranking their most preferred candidate 
through their least preferred. Ballots are initially counted using only the first preferences, 
the same as any other plurality or majority system. If any candidate earns 50 percent plus 
one of the initial votes, they are immediately declared the winner. However, if no 
candidate earns 50 percent plus one, then the candidate with the least amount of votes is 
eliminated and those ballots’ second preferences are redistributed as marked. The process 
repeats itself, with one candidate being eliminated and his or her ballots redistributed 
according to the next preference, until a candidate reaches a majority of the vote.2  
Limited Preferential Vote (LPV) is a preferential voting system slightly modified 
from the Alternative Vote. The LPV system requires voters to rank only three preferences 
on their ballot. Again, any candidate receiving an absolute majority of votes is declared 
the winner. If that threshold is not obtained initially, the lowest ranking candidate is 
eliminated and their second or third preferences are redistributed, identical to the 
Alternative Vote process. Under LPV, but not AV, a ballot can be “exhausted,” meaning 
all three marked preferences have been eliminated in previous counts. When that occurs, 
                                                
2 AV is related to, but not identical with, the Single Transferable Vote. The crucial 
difference is that in STV, typically associated with multi-member districts, victorious 
candidates’ excess votes above the quota for election are also redistributed to second 
preferences. STV is used in elections for the Australian senate, multiple types of Irish 
elections, and in Malta.  
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the ballot is removed from the overall total necessary to reach an absolute majority, thus 
reducing the denominator used to calculate 50 percent plus one (Standish, 2006, 195). 
The differences between LPV and AV are miniscule, and importantly, the incentives for 
parties to form pre-election alliances remain the same. Therefore, the two varieties of 
preference voting will be analyzed interchangeably in this paper.  
There has been general scholarly consensus in evaluating preferential voting 
within the larger framework of democratic electoral systems. First and foremost, 
preferential voting fits within the greater branch of majoritarian systems (Norris, 2004, 
49-50).  Second, despite its ordinal, rather than categorical, balloting structure, preference 
voting displays effects similar to plurality systems (Rae, 1979, 107-108). Third, 
preference voting encourages the crossing of party lines in an effort to produce a single-
party government (Sartori, 1994, 5-6). This process occurs through vote-pooling, as 
parties are rewarded for cooperating with other parties in the sharing of preferences 
(Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 316).  
Criticisms of the redistribution of votes focus on the consequences of vote-
pooling behavior. There is disagreement on the outcomes for small parties, with some 
experts arguing that small parties have no access to government representation under a 
majoritarian system while others contend that vote-pooling elevates small parties to a 
significant pre-election and post-election role as collaborators with major party allies 
(Kumar and Prasad, 2004; Reilly, 1997A). Ben Reilly argues for a preferential voting 
bias towards ideologically centered parties that can recruit allies from both sides of the 
political aisle (Reilly, 1997A, 1). He also suggests there is an increase in independent 
candidates who can win seats by overcoming major party candidates. These independents 
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are theoretically popular enough to overcome major party opponents who receive a large 
initial share of votes, but do not earn steady preference transfers. Independents can defeat 
party members who are simultaneously the most “most liked” and the most “least liked” 
(Reilly, 1997A, 5). Lastly, Peter Fishburn and Steven J. Brams have used mathematical 
modeling to show how slight differences in turnout and head-to-head comparisons can 
produce seemingly paradoxical results in preference voting elections that deviate from 
first past the post logic (Fishburn and Brams, 1983). Overall, preference voting is treated 
as a close relative of first past the post systems with an incentive structure that fosters 
more cooperation.  
Research Question 
This study investigates party behavior, measured through formal pre-election 
alliances between parties, in Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea, in an attempt to 
determine why pre-election alliances are more likely and lasting in some preference 
voting countries than others. As indicated by Douglas Rae, parties are the groups who 
should feel the weight of electoral laws the most and therefore make an appropriate 
choice for studying preference voting’s behavioral impact (Rae, 1979, 4). Despite using 
nearly identical variations of preference voting, Australian, Fijian and Papua New 
Guinean parties do not behave similarly. In particular, major Australian and Fijian parties 
are much more likely to form political alliances than major Papua New Guinean parties.  
What explains this discrepancy? In this study, two potential explanations are 
proposed and examined. First, party systems can vary in their degree of 
institutionalization. Variation in stability, volatility, and rootedness among the sample 
countries could negate the incentives for alliance formation. Specifically, a fluid party 
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system could deter parties from cooperating with each other by making electoral results 
and elite behavior too unpredictable. In this case, preferential voting rules do not serve as 
sufficient catalysts for changes in party behavior. While preferential voting could 
promote cooperation and moderation on the behalf of parties, it is far from guaranteed if 
parties do not make alliances in the first place.  
Secondly, there could be purely mathematical reasons that Papua New Guinea 
parties do not form the types of alliances found among their Australian and Fijian 
counterparts. Preference voting, after all, does not differ from first past the post voting in 
contests where parties can gain an initial majority of the vote. If most races do not require 
the use of preference transfers, than there is little to incentivize parties to pursue vote 
pooling, especially if it requires concessions towards competitors. Furthermore, if initial 
gaps between first and second place candidates are massive, it is highly unlikely that any 
amount of cooperation can overcome the gap. Finally, if all parties appear to benefit and 
suffer equally from the distribution of preferences, in other words if the success rate for 
parties in overcoming initial gaps and holding on to initial leads appears random, than 
there is no need for parties to alter their policies in pursuit of alliances.  
Both hypotheses are rooted in rational choice perspectives. The primary 
assumption is that parties seek to win the most seats possible in government, and that 
motivation trumps strict adherence to party ideologies and platforms that would negate 
forming alliances with any other group. While additional theories are certainly possible, 
the selection of cases allows for the control over cultural and socioeconomic factors that 
could be posited as major explanations of party behavior. The two hypotheses are not 
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necessarily mutually exclusive; it is entirely possible for low levels of institutionalization 
to be combined with a lack of mathematical incentives.  
Quantitative data will be used to assess the level of institutionalization of the 
party system and the distribution of the vote in each country. While desirable, intensive 
statistical analysis through multivariate regression is not possible considering the small 
sample of cases. Attempts to build a large N study would rely heavily on longitudinal 
samples from Australia’s lengthy history of preference voting, exposing the results to 
unhealthy bias from the Australian experience. Therefore, this study takes the form of a 
medium-N structured, focused comparison that develops a heuristic to assess the 
intervening impact of party system institutionalization on party behavior in preference 
voting nations.  
Institutional, Sociological, and System Impacts on Party Behavior 
A daunting amount of political science literature has examined the effects of 
democratic electoral systems. Maurice Duverger famously argued that the structure of the 
electoral system heavily influences the behavior of political parties. Using plurality and 
proportional representation systems, Duverger’s law suggests that the former promotes a 
two party system while the latter develops multiple parties (Duverger, 1963). Douglas 
Rae concluded that plurality and majority systems benefit strong parties, and the leading 
party in particular, over small parties (Rae, 1979). Giovanni Sartori went beyond 
measuring the numerical structure of the party system and added an in-depth focus on the 
interactions between parties. To Sartori, party behavior is motivated in part by 
institutional design and therefore is subject to change (Sartori, 1976).  Sartori modified 
Duverger’s law by determining that plurality systems lead to two party systems only 
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when the party system is structured and racial or linguistic fractures in the electorate are 
minimal (Sartori, 1994, 40). Most recently, Pippa Norris has concluded that parties in 
majoritarian or pluralist systems will shift in centripetal ways to attempt to gain the high 
threshold of votes for office. Conversely, proportional systems do not incentivize parties 
to move towards the middle due to their lower thresholds for election (Norris, 2004, 11). 
All of these scholars rooted their theories in rational choice, on the part of voters 
choosing whom to vote for and parties in providing the maximum utility in their supply. 
Proponents of the preferential voting system are institutionalists who advocate for 
the ability of preferential voting to heavily influence party behavior. Donald Horowitz 
believes that the vote-pooling incentives of the Alternative Vote model help mitigate the 
potential problems of both majority ethnic-group rule and minority ethnic-group rule that 
plague deeply divided societies (Horowitz, 2007). Parties will pool votes by offering 
reciprocal concessions on ethnic issues, so long as no single party is strong enough to win 
enough votes and seats to govern on its own (Reilly, 1997A). Looking specifically at Fiji, 
Horowitz considers Alternative Vote incentives as vital in creating coalitions that cross 
ethnic lines and encourage moderation (Horowitz, 2006). In Papua New Guinea under the 
closely related Limited Preferential Vote, Ben Reilly sees measurable mathematical 
improvements and the beginnings of strategic shifts on the part of parties and elites 
(Reilly, 2006A). This is in line with preference voting’s supposed ability to widen 
support bases and encourage politicians to seek a larger mandate (Standish, 2006). Kumar 
and Prasad emphasize the egalitarian nature of preference voting’s vote-pooling 
incentives. All parties are able to manipulate the exchange of preferences, and therefore 
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the ultimate results in competitive districts, to the best of their abilities (Kumar and 
Prasad 2004, 315).  
Many experts have criticized the institutional perspective for ignoring contextual 
and sociological factors that are also considered to be influences on party behavior.3 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan caution that party politics do not always 
conform to institutional pressures. Historical context, economic divisions, and cultural 
affiliations all influence party behavior (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Arend Lijphart’s 
typology of democratic systems contrasts majoritarian and consensus democracies, based 
on opposing measurements in an executive-parties dimension and a federal-unitary 
dimension (Lijphart, 1999). Lijphart also posits a strong link between relevant issue 
dimensions, similar to Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavages, and the behavior of parties within 
the party system (Lijphart, 1999). Speaking directly to ethnically divided societies, Ben 
Reilly contends that party formation, development, and strategy differ in ethnically 
heterogeneous states from homogenous ones (Reilly, 2006B). 
Critics of preferential voting point to the sociological roots of party behavior. Jon 
Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman have vociferously criticized the ability of the Fijian 
electoral system to modify political behavior that is rooted in ethnic identity (Fraenkel 
and Grofman, 2006). They acknowledge that preference voting yields new potential 
strategies for parties and elites, but they dispute that parties will respond uniformly or 
that moderate behavior will necessarily be rewarded. In another work, Fraenkel contends 
that the conciliatory behavior suggested by Horowitz is, at best, one possible pathway to 
                                                
3 For a complete review of the debate between institutional and cultural-sociological 
schools of thought, see Norris, 2004.  
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electoral success under preference voting, rather than a fait accompli (Fraenkel, 2004, 
125).  
Arend Lijphart, the foremost advocate of consociational politics that emphasize 
the need to use, instead of undermine, ethnic parties as the basis for power-sharing, 
doubts that minority parties will accept a system that favors the majority through its 
single-member districts. Therefore, Lijphart has consistently criticized preference voting 
as a solution for ethnically divided societies (Lijphart, 2004; Lijphart, 1991). Lijphart 
instead champions list PR within multi-member districts. Using a closed list, proportional 
system with multi-member districts would, in Lijphart’s eyes, allow for strengthened 
minority representation at the party level while allowing for power-sharing among 
various ethnic elites at the parliamentary level. Additionally, list PR is subjectively 
“simpler” to understand for voters and eases the burden of rules communication for 
parties and institutions alike (Lijphart, 2004; Fraenkel and Grofman, 2004). These 
features are especially significant in developing democracies with multiple languages, 
low literacy rates, and less robust communication infrastructure. Furthermore, the rounds 
of counting required by preference voting could theoretically be ripe for corruption and 
manipulation by electoral management authorities, a problem potentially stifled through 
the proportional single round of counting in list PR.  
Party System Institutionalization 
A middle-ground approach looks at both sociological and historical development, 
as well as institutional constraints, in explaining party behavior. The party system refers 
to the patterns of competitive interaction among the parties (Rae, 1979, 47).  According 
to Dalton and Weldon, parties “form and structure the functioning of democratic 
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government” (Dalton and Weldon, 2007, 179). The party system implies multiple parties, 
an amount of regularity in the level of party support, and relative continuity over time. 
Institutionalists have offered tentative, but underdeveloped suggestions that something 
more than electoral rules shapes parties’ rational calculations. Giovanni Sartori 
differentiated between structured and unstructured party systems, depending on the level 
of allegiance to elites as individuals versus parties (Sartori, 1994, 37-38). In unstructured 
environments, Sartori predicted that plurality electoral systems normal reductive 
tendencies would be mitigated. Digging deeper, Rein Taagepera codes Sartori’s 
unstructured systems as party constellations, deeming them insufficiently stable for the 
use of system terminology (Taagepera, 2002, 249).  
The most influential contribution towards party systems comes from Scott 
Mainwaring. Mainwaring’s innovative descriptions of party system institutionalization 
have transformed how party systems are viewed. To Mainwaring, “party system 
institutionalization means that actors entertain clear and stable expectations about the 
behavior of other actors, and hence about the fundamental contours and rules of party 
competition and behavior” (Mainwaring, 1998, 69). This newer line of thinking provides 
measurable conceptual distinction between the workings of the party system in older 
democracies and newer ones.  
In order to best model the behavior of party systems in younger democracies, 
Scott Mainwaring emphasizes that institutional and sociological factors interact in 
unpredictable ways.  Scholars must measure the degree of institutionalization of the party 
system itself in order to predict its behavior. At the two ends of the spectrum, party 
systems that are fluid should behave differently than party systems that are 
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institutionalized, even if the electoral rules are identical. Fluid party systems produce 
distinct strategies for elites to capitalize on the institutional setting (Mainwaring, 1998; 
Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005).  
Four fundamental dimensions shape the level of institutionalization in a given 
system. Stability reflects the extent to which party competition is patterned in a 
regularized fashion. Party rootedness indicates how thoroughly parties have reached the 
voters in communicating their positions and ideologies. Legitimacy represents the extent 
to which elites respect and funnel their activities through parties as mechanisms for 
political competition. Finally, organizational strength refers to the ability of parties to 
exist independent of their leaders.  
  Mainwaring offers multiple potential ways to measure each of his four 
dimensions of party system institutionalization. Stability is frequently assessed through 
electoral volatility using Pedersen’s Index, which calculates the total change in 
percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the subsequent one, 
then divided by two (Mainwaring, 1998, 71). Allan Sikk adds an additional component to 
measuring stability by differentiating between new parties and old ones. When high 
volatility is paired with high levels of success for new parties, the system is at its most 
unstable (Sikk, 2005).   
Mainwaring’s second dimension of institutionalization is parties’ roots in society, 
a much more difficult concept to measure. In his 2005 study with Mariano Torcal, 
Mainwaring uses survey analysis to compare the extent of party voting in 33 democracies 
with respondents’ ideological positions on the left-right scale. Their conclusion is 
variance in ideological voting is closely tied to stability (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005, 
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211). Other tests include the percentage of survey respondents who have a consistent 
party preference, the difference between party votes in concurrent presidential and 
legislative elections, and the duration over time of the most successful parties. 
Additionally, Mainwaring considers the ability of independent candidates to win office as 
a sign of rootedness (Mainwaring, 1998).  
There is some disagreement over how the causal mechanisms of stability work. 
Margit Tavits uses instrumental variable regression with Central and Eastern European 
democracies to test if there are measurable differences between electoral volatility and 
party system instability. Tavits concludes that elite behavior is the prime driver of 
electoral volatility. Rather than party elites responding to the inconsistent behavior of 
voters by consistently changing the supply of parties, changes in the supply of parties 
produce higher rates of electoral volatility (Tavits, 2008, 547). Conversely, Dalton and 
Weldon assert high levels of partisanship to have a dampening effect on electoral 
volatility and system stability, suggesting that voter behavior precedes elite decision 
making in relation to supply (Dalton and Weldon, 2007, 180).  
Mainwaring’s third dimension is legitimacy of parties and elections. Survey 
analysis can be used to assess how voters feel about parties’ role in the democratic 
process. If citizens have high degrees of trust in parties as vital components of 
democracies than the party system is more institutionalized (Mainwaring, 1998). 
 Finally, the fourth dimension of institutionalization is party organization. 
Qualitatively, this can be determined through inspection of how parties choose leaders 
and the amount of resources and professional staff accorded to parties versus individual 
leaders. A quantitative measure of party organization assesses how often political elites 
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switch parties; when organizational loyalty is high, the system is said to have strong 
organization (Mainwaring, 1998, 78-79).  
Selection of Cases 
The research sample includes eight election cycles from three countries: Australia 
(2004, 2007, 2010), Fiji (1999, 2001, 2006), and Papua New Guinea (2007, 2012). Every 
election used preferential voting electoral in a national parliamentary election with all 
seats contested. The three countries share relative geographic proximity and 
Commonwealth history, and Australia’s influence certainly played a role in the diffusion 
of preference voting to Fiji and Papua New Guinea. To summarize according to Rae’s 
classification system, the population for analysis is uniform in its ordinal ballots, district 
magnitude of one, and Majority rule for declaring winners (Rae, 1979). Other preference 
voting elections, from Ireland or Sri Lanka, most prominently, are ruled out of 
consideration because they are not parliamentary and therefore feature a different set of 
theoretical incentives.  
Australia represents the seminal case of preference voting, using the alternative 
vote system in state and federal elections since World War I. Preference voting was 
presented as an improvement over first past the post voting because it allowed 
ideologically compatible parties to work together rather than splitting their votes to the 
detriment of both parties (Reilly, 1997A, 3). As a result, the possibility of minority 
winners is negated in favor of most preferred candidates. Initial scholarship suggested 
that results under alternative vote varied little from first past the post (Rae, 1979). 
However, more recent analysis indicates results under preferential voting have differed 
from hypothetical calculations using FPTP. In other words, the major winner of an 
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election can hinge on seats won by parties initially trailing in a given constituency 
(Reilly, 1997A). With its highly stable party system, Australia serves as a test for how the 
causal mechanism between electoral system and party behavior is supposed to function. 
Alliance formation between relatively like-minded parties should play an instrumental 
role in determining winners in races without an initial majority.  
Fiji adopted the Alternative Vote system in an attempt to move past the racial 
politics enshrined in its post-independence constitution and reinforced through 
subsequent armed coups that have occurred when an Indo-Fijian party has defeated a 
splintered Fijian majority. After a lengthy constitutional review process, AV was used in 
three national elections: 1999, 2001, and 2006. AV was seen as a prescription to cure 
many of the ailments of modern Fijian politics, most significantly the politicized cleavage 
between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians, the descendants of indentured laborers from 
Fiji’s past as a British colony. First past the post rules rewarded candidates and parties 
that aligned with the largest ethnic group in each district, regardless of potentially racist 
or ethnically exclusive policies. By introducing preference voting, Fijian reformers 
sought to encourage parties to reach out to different ethnic groups in order to gain 
preference votes. Parties that relied on simple plurality were now at risk of losing 
elections if they could not acquire the second preferences of competing parties. As a 
consequence, ethnic parties would adopt broader issue-based platforms and embrace 
moderate multiethnic agendas.  
There is considerable debate over the impact of the AV system in Fiji. Jon 
Fraenkel cautions that it is hard to isolate the role of AV on the results of the elections 
due to the massive increase in voter turnout as a result of new mandatory voting 
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regulation, the continued use of racially reserved districts, and the discrepancy in district 
size between rural and urban areas (Fraenkel, 2000, 89-90). The major thesis of 
Fraenkel’s work is that there is no clear reason why parties should become more 
moderate under AV. If ethnic fragmentation is a clear cleavage, then moderate parties 
may gain an advantage from pursuing alliances with radical partners. Furthermore, 
moderate parties may ally with radical parties on the opposing ethnic group purely to 
defeat a key rival, even if the partners’ views stand in clear opposition to each other 
(Fraenkel, 2001, 22). Fraenkel and Grofman object theoretically to the underlying 
assumptions of how voters rank preferences in divided societies. Using a two-
dimensional model of Fijian political space and the ways in which preferences impacted 
certain districts in 1999 and 2001, the authors assert that Fijian voters and parties have 
not congregated on moderate lines (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006; Fraenkel, 2004). Robert 
Stockwell has blamed AV, through disproportionate outcomes that have favored extreme 
parties, for fostering even more extreme party behavior and punishing moderation 
(Stockwell, 2005).   
Donald Horowitz has responded to many of Fraenkel and Grofman’s arguments. 
He consistently asserts that many ethnic parties will rationally behave moderately prior to 
and after elections in an effort to attract cross-ethnic preference transfers (Horowitz, 
2006). Secondly, Horowitz disputes the authors’ modeling of rational voting behavior, 
which he feels mischaracterizes the preference decisions of moderate voters (Horowitz, 
2006, 655; Horowitz, 2007).   
Kumar and Prasad stress that Fiji’s recent political instability stems from 
powerful institutions that do not embrace democratic rules, not the electoral system 
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(Kumar and Prasad, 2004). The authors highlight the hypocrisy in criticizing AV as a 
system for producing the 1999 results in Fiji while the 2001 results under the same set of 
rules led to a much more well-received outcome.  As far as party behavior is concerned, 
Kumar and Prasad reiterate that alliance-formation cannot be viewed in a one-party 
vacuum. Instead, different arrangements of alliances within the entire system can 
combine with vacillating initial vote shares to produce inconsistent “elasticity” for a 
given election. Changing combinations of alliances can alter the potential impact of 
preference trading (Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 326). The debates over labeling respective 
parties in Fiji and modeling the behavior of voters remain contentious.  
Two items are of note in the selection and study of Fijian elections. First, this 
study does not depend on placing Fijian parties along any spectrum from radical to 
moderate. Instead, the actual existence of formal alliances will be analyzed in cross-
national comparisons with the Australian and Papua New Guinean cases, without 
attempting to measure each alliance’s character or legitimacy. Second, the Fijian cases 
stop at 2006, providing only three elections to analyze. Fiji has not had an election since 
2006, as Commodore Frank Bainimarama has ruled the island state through decree from 
his position as self-appointed Prime Minister.  
Papua New Guinea initially used the Alternative Vote model in the buildup to its 
independence from Australia in 1975. In its first thirty years of independence, Papua New 
Guinea enjoyed uninterrupted democratic experience without ever having a government 
last a full five-year term.  No confidence votes, resignations, and coalition chaos became 
the hallmarks of Papua New Guinea politics (Okole, 2005). In an effort to increase 
political legitimacy, raise the number of people with a link to the winning candidate, 
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lower the overall number of candidates, and decrease electoral violence, Limited 
Preferential Voting was adopted for 2007 (Standish, 2006, Reilly, 2006A, Reilly, 
2007A).  
Operationalization and Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the study is formal pre-election alliances between 
political parties. These pre-election alliances serve as pledges to communicate to party 
supporters the desire to transfer second preferences to the reciprocating party. The raw 
number of alliances serves as the primary indicator, using information gathered from 
newspapers, political websites, party declarations, and previous scholarly research.  
Independent Variable 1 
The first independent variable in the study is the level of institutionalization in the 
party system. In an attempt to marry the scholarship on party system institutionalization 
with the data available, three dimensions will be considered: stability, volatility, and 
rootedness. First, I have chosen to separate pre-electoral and post-electoral measurements 
of stability into two categories. For this analysis, stability refers to the level of 
consistency found in the party supply. The volatility dimension examines the changes in 
electoral results at both an individual and party level.  These two dimensions are not 
equivalent, as it is entirely possible for there to be massive change in the party supply 
without a significant shift in election results. In a dominant two-party system, this 
scenario would suggest that minor parties come and go without much influence on the 
actual outcome. Conversely, changing calculations on the behalf of parties or voters 
could lead to dramatic shifts in the results, high volatility in other words, while the supply 
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remains the same. The final dimension is party rootedness.  Rootedness concerns the 
strength of linkages between elites and parties. These three dimensions represent a 
variation of Mainwaring’ four dimensions discussed previously. Legitimacy of parties is 
not considered due to lack of relevant survey data for both Fiji and Papua New Guinea, 
while party organization is folded into my definition of rootedness.   
Stability. Multiple indicators exist to measure stability of party supply, most of 
which require longitudinal analysis to track changes over the course of multiple elections.  
• The number of parties contesting elections, broken down incrementally 
based on the percentage of seats each party contested.  
• Parties Entering: the percentage of new parties contesting a given election.  
• Parties Exiting: the percentage of parties not running after having run in 
the previous election.  
Volatility. Volatility will be measured in five ways. From a theoretical 
perspective, it is vital to capture a nuanced view of both stability and volatility. Because 
parties vary in their electoral and parliamentary relevance, not all unit shifts in the party 
system are equal (Norris, 2004; Sartori, 1994). For this reason, the indicators below cover 
a variety of perspectives on relevancy. 
• How successful Parties Entering were at winning representation in 
government.  
• How successful Parties Exiting were at winning representation in 
government.  
• The effective number of parliamentary parties; calculated using the 
Laakso-Taagepera Index. The Index is one divided by the sums of the 
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squares of each seat-winning parties’ proportion of seats. (Laakso and 
Taagepera, 1979).4  
• The percentage of incumbents who win reelection.  
• The Electoral Volatility between two consecutive electoral cycles.5 The 
standard measure for this indicator is Pedersen’s Index, which takes the 
sum of the absolute value of change in vote share for each party in two 
consecutive cycles and divides it by two (Pedersen, 1979).  
Rootedness. Four indicators will be used to determine this dimension. 
• The number of independents contesting seats. 
• The number of independents who win seats.  
• The number of incumbents who win reelection after switching parties.  
• The number of elected MPs who switch parties within one year of an 
election.  
The hypothesis suggests that level of institutionalization serves as an intervening 
variable between the electoral system and the formation of party alliances. Party 
institutionalization exists across a spectrum, not a binary opposition, ranging from high to 
                                                
4 Golosov (2010) provides an alternate measure of effective parliamentary parties that 
weights all parties in relation to the strength of the party that won the most seats. 
Typically, this results in a slight reduction of the effective number of parliamentary 
parties calculated by the Laakso-Taagepera Index. Because this study contrasts the very 
small number of effective parties in Australia and Fiji with the much larger number of 
effective parties in Papua New Guinea, the subtleties of the Golosov Index are 
unnecessary.  
 
5 There are some difficulties in assessing party mergers and splits that can lead to 
different outcomes in Electoral Volatility (Sikk, 2005, 392). Therefore, careful and 
consistent use of expert analysis will help provide accurate measurements in each case 
study as to how to most accurately capture volatility. 
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low. In party systems with low degrees of institutionalization, fluid systems, parties may 
be less likely to form alliances with others for several reasons. Instability and volatility 
prevent parties from estimating the benefits from prospective alliances, while also 
hampering the potential for long-term partnerships between parties. The programmatic 
compromises that are potentially necessary to cement alliances are increasingly difficult 
in settings where new parties quickly emerge on the scene and old parties rapidly 
disappear, seemingly irrespective of electoral success.  
Personalistic elite behavior, the opposite of rootedness, suggests that parties have 
less power than elites. When this is true, as in cases where independents consistently win 
large shares of seats and politicians’ allegiances to parties are ephemeral, the incentives 
of preference voting are dampened. This is because preference voting benefits parties in 
the big picture far more than it benefits individual politicians at the district level. At the 
level of the single electoral contest, the transfer of preferences is unidirectional, whereas 
at the national level, preferences are traded multi-directionally. Therefore, personalistic 
politicians need only consider themselves, negating the motivation to make alliances to 
give away their own votes if they happen to lose. In a system without a network of 
politicians beholden to the party, the mutually beneficial rewards of preference trades are 
harder to realize. Coordination between politicians in one district makes little sense when 
there are no potential rewards for those politicians in other districts.  
Independent Variable 2  
The second independent variable in the study is strategic viability. This variable 
emphasizes a level of strategic imagination following institutional choice theory on the 
part of parties and political elites. Under this approach, it is significant to consider both 
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the previous election and the expected results of the impending one in determining 
rational party behavior.  The theory posits that party behavior is learned and based on 
previous patterns. In the case of Papua New Guinea, a reasonable argument could be 
made that there has been little opportunity to observe difference in outcomes based on 
alliances precisely because there have been so few alliances. While this is unavoidably 
true, there is also a diffusion argument that Papua New Guinea party leaders could have 
learned from the experiences of dozens of elections in Australia, a close political partner 
and donor nation, and the three elections in Fiji, a regional ally. Indicators for strategic 
viability include: 
• The frequency of outright majority wins on the first preference count. 
• The frequency that the winner of a seat was in second place or worse after the 
initial count. 
• The frequency that parties in an alliance maintained initial leads compared to the 
success rates for parties not in an alliance.  
• The frequency that the parties in an alliance overcame gaps compared to the 
success rates for parties not in an alliance.  
• The overall effectiveness of parties in alliances compared to parties of comparable 
size not in alliances. 
The causal mechanism advanced through this hypothesis is that parties are more likely to 
use alliances as a strategy if they know electoral success will be enhanced. If alliances are 
unnecessary for success or if they lead to similar rates of success as non-alliances, than 




Data Sources  
The data for measuring each independent variable, and their associated indicators, 
comes from a combination of electoral results available through the three nations’ 
electoral commissions and my own calculations. Using the electoral data for district races 
and national results, I have calculated all the measurements of party system 
institutionalization presented in the case studies. Electoral data for each case study has 
been accumulated from numerous sources. For Australia, the Australia Electoral 
Commission serves as a thorough resource on preference voting breakdowns by district. 
For Australia and Fiji, Adam Carr’s Election Archive documents previous elections 
results based on national electoral reports. In particular for Fiji, this resource is invaluable 
due to the continued military rule and its effect on the public availability of information 
on the AV electoral system through the Fiji Election’s Office. For Papua New Guinea, 
multiple sources are necessary for corroboration. Information from the National Research 
Institute and Carr’s Election Archive provides fully documented information on the 2007 
election. For the recent 2012 election, the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission has 
the most complete set of records. Political websites, such as The Garamut run by political 
commentator Deni ToKunai, have updates on the behavior of elites in-between the 
election cycles. Personal communication with Mr. ToKunai has been established for aid 
in this project. Personal communication with Australian scholar Norm Kelly has also 
been invaluable in acquiring the most complete data possible for the 2012 Papua New 
Guinea election. Additional sources for data include Melanesian newspapers, the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), and the IFES 
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Election Guide from the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening 
(CEPPS).  
Alliances and Institutionalization 
There remains a dearth of comparative research on political party behavior under 
preferential voting systems. The studies that do exist are principally focused on one 
particular party system and in using that evidence to condemn or celebrate the voting 
system at large. Studies on the Australian model highlight the extent to which preference 
voting differs from hypothetical first past the post results. Another principle issue, as seen 
in Fiji, is the obsession with moralizing on the behavior of parties. As a result, published 
work assesses the moderation of winning parties in comparison with the presumed 
moderation of the election’s losers. These moderation effects, or lack thereof, are then 
used to assess the validity of using preference voting to change party platforms in 
multiethnic and highly fragmented societies. These studies have rightfully indicated that 
preference voting bears more of a resemblance to plurality and majoritarian systems than 
proportional ones. However, the potential reward for cooperative and moderate parties 
breaks from the winner-take-all effects of pure two-party plurality systems.  
A more fundamental question that should be asked is if the preferential voting 
model is actually able to change party behavior, rather than grading the behavior and 
automatically attributing it to the electoral system. The most direct test is to examine 
alliances. After all, the prime reason for the adoption of the preferential model in Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea was to encourage parties to seek preference votes outside of their core 
group. Are parties seeking alliances in a patterned way? Or, are intervening factors such 
as weak party system institutionalization somehow blocking the incentives of preferential 
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voting and even offering conflicting ones? If parties are behaving in a myriad of ways 
under the same institutional rules, then it changes how the institutional model is viewed 
and weighted.  
Alternative Voting’s advocates claim that it fosters moderation and cooperation 
through electoral incentives that benefit parties that consistently receive second and third 
preferences. It follows that parties must attempt to earn these preferences through pre-
election efforts, and that party-to-party commitments carry more potential benefit than 
appeals to individual voters. Even preference voting’s critics agree that there are 
substantial benefits to forming alliances, moderate or not. The remaining questions are, 
first, do all party systems respond to these incentives in the same ways? And second, do 
alliances have the same effects in all types of systems?  
The following chapters will consider these questions, first by examining the case 
studies from each country, and second through a synthesis of the entire sample. The next 
three chapters cover Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea respectively. In the final 
chapter, by analyzing alliances in conjunction with party system institutionalization and 
electoral impacts, a heuristic device for predicting party behavior in diverse party systems 









Chapter Two: Australia 
Australia provides a baseline for testing the interplay of electoral system choice 
and party system institutionalization on the formation of alliances. Beginning with 
Australia makes sense: the nation has used the Alternative Vote for elections to its lower 
house for close to a century. In addition to electoral seniority among the sample, 
Australia also has the largest population at over 23 million and the largest legislature at 
150 members. Furthermore, Australian politics, particularly elections, are well 
documented and thoroughly researched, leaving a lengthy trail of scholarly evidence to 
consult for trends. Australia’s touted political stability makes for an intriguing contrast 
with the fledgling democracies of Fiji and Papua New Guinea.  
By almost any indication, Australia’s federal parliamentary democratic system is 
a success. The nation boasts elite scores from Freedom House, the Democracy Index, and 
countless others. Australia’s free and fair elections are made all the more unique through 
the nation’s use of the Alternative Vote and compulsory voting, features that the 
Australian government has recently sought to diffuse across the antipodean world in its 
role as an exporter of democracy.  
One of the major proclaimed virtues of the Australian political system is its 
competitive stability. On the left of the ideological spectrum, the Labor Party reigns 
supreme even as it has shifted ideologically in its degree of radicalism (McDonald, 
Mendes, and Kim, 2007). On the right, an enduring partnership between the Liberal Party 
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and the National Party, collectively dubbed the Coalition, functions essentially as a single 
unit. In the words of L. Lipson, Australia’s party system can be effectively described as 
“a trio in form, but a duet in function.”6 If one considers the Coalition as a collective 
whole, which as will be discussed later is conventional if not wholly uncontroversial, 
than Australia has a remarkably stable two party dynamic. Only once has a non-Labor, 
non-Coalition party won even ten percent of the vote since World War I (Farrell and 
McAllister, 2005). The two dominant powers combined have earned roughly ninety 
percent of the vote each election since World War II (Papadakis and Bean, 1995, 100). 
Levels of class voting are far lower than in most established democracies, making 
Australia relatively immune to demographic changes in that regard (Brooks, 
Nieuwbeerta, and Manza, 2006). Yet, Australian politics are enduringly competitive as 
well. Since 1937, no party has won four straight elections. Over that period, the Labor 
Party has won between 38 and 50 percent of first preferences while the Coalition has 
hovered between 40 and 53 percent.7 
This chapter considers the recent consistency of this stability and the role it plays, 
along with the preferential voting system, in influencing Australian party behavior. After 
a brief review of the history of the Alternative Vote in Australia and its lasting impacts, 
the three most recent elections to the lower house of Parliament are reviewed. For each 
election, the alliances, party system institutionalization, and actual preference voting 
mechanics are considered within the context of the results. A final section will draw 
                                                
6 Quoted in Farrell and McAllister, 2005, 81.  
 
7 Data obtained from the Australian Electoral Commission.  
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tentative conclusions on the role of the party system in influencing party behavior under 
preferential voting incentives.  
A History of the Alternative Vote in Australia 
 Preferential voting’s origins date to the nineteenth century. Liberal British 
political thinkers initially proposed the system of instant run-offs, but it was conservative 
Australians who implemented the model for the first time in major elections in 1918 
(Farrell and McAllister, 2005). Only a few elections removed from the inception of the 
federation, Australian political competition had showed signs of crystallizing around a 
particularly common result: a unified Labor party defeating a divided conservative 
majority, split between urban and rural elements of the National Party, the predecessor of 
today’s Liberal Party. A Royal Commission recommended preferential voting for the 
lower house, under the theoretical premise that it would negate the issue of vote splitting, 
and the National government passed preferential voting into law in 1918 (Reilly, 1997A; 
Bean, 1986; Graham, 1962).  
 Oddly, the preferential voting system was immediately championed by all 
factions in the broader conservative umbrella as a solution for their woes. The National 
Party had originally formed as a merger between free trade and protectionist interests and 
was soon threatened by urban versus rural factionalism as well. The powerful urban 
National officials looked favorably upon the chances for its most diehard farming 
constituents to act independently without undermining the parties’ overall chances at 
success. According to historian B.D. Graham, preferential voting was seen as a way to 
embrace decentralization, which would decrease conservative tensions, without harming 
the chances of electoral success (Graham, 1962, 175). The rebellious rural leaders within 
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the National Party pushed for the changes in an effort to highlight their agenda in specific 
constituencies under a new Farmer’s Union Party. Even the Labor Party favored the 
change as a means of cementing a two-party system. 
 Experts have viewed the Alternative Vote system as little more than an austral 
idiosyncrasy. Douglas Rae compared results from the AV system to those achieved under 
plurality formulae and concluded that the two were virtually identical. Fractionalization 
of the government, disproportionality favoring the top party, and magnification of small 
voting shifts into major seat displacement in the elected body are all comparable under 
preference voting’s majority formula and the more conventional plurality systems (Rae, 
1979). Many of Rae’s contemporaries agreed, summarizing the impact of the Alternative 
Vote on voting results as unsubstantial if not wholly irrelevant (Butler, 1973; Hughes, 
1977).  
 Nevertheless, many of the same authors have suggested ways in which preference 
voting under the Alternative Vote method has impacted Australian political dynamics. 
Most obviously, the Liberal Party and Nationalist Party have maintained a close 
partnership, albeit under different monikers, without having to fuse entirely (Bean, 1986, 
64).8 There have also been benefits for parties outside the main competitors. The most 
viable third party of the 1960s, the Democratic Labor Party, possessed an ability to 
influence policy far greater than its vote share would suggest in a pluralist system. By 
reliably transferring preferences to the Liberal-Nationalist contingent, the DLP 
functioned as the major lever for the Coalition to defeat Labor in close races and received 
                                                
8 It is easiest to consider today’s Liberal Party as the descendent of the old National 
Party, while the present day Nationalist Party has roots in the Farmer’s Union Party.  
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policy concessions as a result (Butler, 1973). C.A. Hughes has shown that from 1949 to 
1975, Labor lost far more seats than it won in races decided by preferences. Of the 84 
elections in which the Alternative Vote redistributions yielded an ultimate winner 
different from the initial first preference leader, the Labor Party won only four times 
(Hughes, 1977, 294).  Clive Bean and others have suggested that Alternative Vote helps 
centrist parties, which can win elections despite initial deficits as a result of their 
proximate positioning to a defeated party on either side of the spectrum (Bean, 1986; 
Graham, 1962).  
 The significance and direction of preference exchanges have shifted relatively 
recently. During the 1990s, preferences were used to determine winners in close to half of 
the districts, while eventual winners who did not initially lead remained at about five 
percent (Reilly, 1997B; Farrell and McAllister, 2005). Minor parties have also shown 
slight growth trends over the last twenty years. Consistently below eleven percent of the 
vote cumulatively since the 1950s, and without a single seat in the House of 
Representatives to show for it, minor parties could exert control only through the 
occasional exchange of preferences (Papadakis and Bean, 1995). However, as Western 
and Tranter have shown, a growing number of Australians are voting according to post-
materialist principles, increasing the share of the vote for the Green Party and the 
revitalized Australian Democratic Party in recent years at the expense of the materialist-
oriented appeals of Labor and the Coalition (Western and Tranter, 2001). Originally to 
the benefit of the Coalition, preferences have come increasingly towards Labor 
candidates as left-wing minor parties have exceeded the vote shares of right-wing small 
parties and carved into Coalition totals. Even independent candidates have won seats in 
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Parliament as a result of vote transfers directed away from major party candidates (Reilly, 
1997A, Reilly, 1997B). The Alternative Vote, and the strategies of parties adopted as a 
result of the preference system, has never been more important.  
The 2004 Election 
 The 2004 Australian Federal Election resulted in a triumphant victory for the 
Liberal Party and reigning Prime Minister John Howard. The win allowed Howard to 
serve a fourth term as Prime Minister, a rare feat in Australian political annals. On the 
losing end, the Labor Party earned its lowest vote share in a hundred years. Analysts 
reviewing the election determined the massive Coalition victory was most directly due to 
Howard’s comfortable edge in leadership appeal over Labor chief Mark Latham. While 
health, education, and taxation proved to be the major issues in voter’s minds, the 
cumulative evaluation of the two parties on those topics cancelled out. If anything, strong 
economic performance and surprising levels of support for Australia’s role in the Iraq 
War helped the Coalition (McAllister and Bean, 2006).  
Table 2.1—Results by Party 2004 
Party Percentage of first-
preference votes 
Seats Won 
Liberal Party 40.8% 74 
National Party 5.9% 12 
Labor Party 37.6% 60 
Green Party 7.2% 0 
Family First 2.0% 0  
Australian Democrats 1.2% 0  
One Nation 1.2% 0  





Two major alliances featured in the 2004 election. The Liberal Party continued its 
long-running formal partnership with the National Party: a situation so institutionalized 
that most political commentary refers to the two parties as a single political force, the 
Coalition. They were joined by the Country Liberal Party, a Northern Territory based 
proxy of the two Coalition partners that is, for all intents and purposes, an amalgam of the 
two. Also in the fold was the Family First Party, which allocated the vast majority of its 
preferences to the Liberal Party.9 The Labor Party secured a deal with the Green Party, 
the minor party that ultimately performed best on first preferences.  
Party System Institutionalization 
The institutionalization of the Australian party system in 2004 can be measured 
using three key dimensions: stability, volatility, and rootedness.  
Figure 2.1: Australia 2004 Party Sponsorship of Candidates 
 
                                                
9 Family First Party, Media Release, 24 September 2004, “House of Representatives 





Table 2.2—Party and Candidate Data 2004 
Total Number 
of Parties 







26 7.3 8 3 
 
Figure 2.1 provides the breakdown in party size for the 2004 election. Despite a 
seemingly large number of competing parties, the election was primarily contested by a 
small contingent of major parties. Aside from the National Party, which won half of the 
24 seats it contested largely due to the Liberal Party withholding candidates in the 
majority of those races, the lion’s share of parties with under sixty percent candidate 
representation were fundamentally irrelevant.10 Another way to look at stability is 
through the rise and fall of parties, presented in Table 2.2. Slightly less than a third of all 
the parties contesting the 2004 election were new, and overall the 26 parties represented 
an increase over the previous election.  
The next dimension considered is volatility. Continuing from the stability 
measurements, it is vital to track the actual electoral performance of Exiting Parties and 
Entering Parties. Table 2.3 reveals the lack of impact made by any of the new parties and 
the complete lack of electoral power held by the Exiting Parties.  


















3 0 8 31% 0 
                                                
10 The exclusively Northern Territory based Country Liberal Party won one of the two 
Northern Territory seats.  
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Volatility can also be tracked through aggregate measurements that capture the 
performance of all parties. Table 2.4 summarizes the two-party nature of the party system 
in 2004 using the effective number of parliamentary parties, which attempts to succinctly 
represent the presence and voting power of parties elected to the Parliament. In 2004, 
Australia’s effective number of parliamentary parties based on the Laakso-Taagepera 
Index was 2.44, showing the dominant role of the Liberal and Labor parties and the small 
presence of the National Party (which the index does not recognize as affiliated with 
Liberal) and three independents. Incumbency reelection percentage provides an 
indication of how consistent individual district results are. With 85.3% of all elected MPs 
retaining their seats, volatility was remarkably low in 2004. Lastly, Pedersen’s Index of 
Electoral Volatility corroborates the evidence presented thus far. An Index rating of 7.5 
means that there was very little change in the percentage of votes earned by Australian 
parties in 2004 compared with the previous election.  
Table 2.4—Volatility 2004 








2.44 85.3% 7.5 
 
 The final dimension of party system institutionalization to be considered is 
rootedness, or its opposite, personalistic elite behavior. Table 2.5 provides data on the 
role of independents in the 2004 election. While many independents ran, almost a 
hundred in fact, only three were victorious. At a glance this suggests that party-sponsored 
candidates have a distinct advantage over the unaffiliated.  A second way to measure 
personalistic elite behavior focuses on the actions of members of parliament after they are 
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elected. Zero members of parliament switched parties between 2004 and the subsequent 
election in 2007, demonstrating how disciplined members of the class were.   



















99 0.66 3 0 0 
  
Mechanics 
We will now turn to how preferential voting played a role in the 2004 election. 
Table 2.6 shows that the 2004 election continued from the trends of the 1990s in terms of 
the frequency of preference use to determine winners. While the average winning 
candidate received an initial vote over the 50% threshold, more than 40% of races were 
determined through preference exchange. Of those districts, almost 13% saw the eventual 
winner come from behind, thereby reversing the assumed winner under a plurality 
formula. It is important to keep in mind that this assumption is a tenuous one. Voters 
under the counterfactual FPTP hypothesis might have voted differently, knowing their 
votes were counted only for their party of choice.  







Average first preference 
percentage for victorious 
candidate 
Winner 
initially in 2nd 
or worse after 
first count 




 The Labor Party was the clear victor in the races that went to preference 
exchanges. All eight of the come-from-behind victories were Labor candidates, primarily 
using preferences from Green candidates, passing members of the Coalition. While the 
Coalition conclusively won the election, the results possibly would have been even worse 
for the Labor Party if not for their ability to use preferences to defeat eight leading 
Coalition candidates and to maintain all of their own leads.  
Table 2.7—Preference Success by Alliance 2004 
Alliance Seats Won Leads Maintained 
After Use of 
Preferences 
Leads Lost 









87 24 8 0 
Challenger 
(Labor-Green) 




3 1 0 0 
 
The 2007 Election 
 In 2007, the Labor Party reversed a decade of Coalition rule with a dominant 
electoral victory. Described as “one of the most dramatic reversals in Australian political 
history,” the Labor Party’s victory has largely been attributed to new leadership and a 
scandal-plagued Liberal government (Williams, 2008, 105). The Coalition’s attempts to 
deregulate Australian labor through the Work Choices Bill led to massive pushback 
against the Howard government. In 2006, news broke of a major scheme involving illegal 
kickbacks, in violation of United Nations’ Oil-for-Food agreements, from the Australian 
Wheat Board to Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government. Adding to the misery for the 
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Liberal Party, John Howard’s personal ratings took a hit when it was revealed that he had 
broken promises to treasurer Peter Costello to hand over party leadership. Howard’s 
decline coincided with the Labor Party’s election of Kevin Rudd as its new leader. The 
media-savvy Rudd quickly skyrocketed Labor’s leadership appeal and contributed 
significantly to the victory in 2007 (Williams, 2008).  
Table 2.8—Results By Party 2007 
Party Percentage of first-
preference votes 
Seats won 
Labor Party 43.4% 83  
Liberal Party 36.6% 55 
National Party 5.5% 10 
Green Party 7.8% 0 
Family First 2.0% 0 
Christian Democrats 0.8% 0 
Australian Democrats 0.7% 0 
Other 3.2% 2 
 
Alliances  
In 2007, the Labor Party continued in its alliance with the Green Party. The 
Liberal Party, still tethered to the Nationals, also struck a deal for the second preferences 
of the Family First Party. No other formal preference transfers emerged.  
Party System Institutionalization 
 Only 20 parties contested the 2007 election, down six from the 2004 election. As 
evident from Table 2.9, more minor parties exited the system than entered, contributing 
most acutely to the drop. The overall decline in candidates was miniscule, as the major 
parties wielded similar numbers of candidates to 2004. Broadly speaking, the 2007 
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election featured instability among the small parties but continued stability among the 
major electoral powers. 
Figure 2.2—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 2007 
 
Table 2.9—Party and Candidate Data 2007 
Total Number 
of Parties 
Average number of 
candidates per 
district 
Parties Entering Parties 
Exiting 
20 7.0 6 12 
 
 Table 2.10 demonstrates the negligible electoral effect of the changes in party 
supply. None of the twelve Exiting Parties had won representation in the 2004 




















Parties in total 
number of 
parties 
Seats won by 
Entering 
Parties 
12 0 6 30% 0 
 
 The Laakso-Taagepera Index for effective number of parliamentary parties in 
2007 dipped slightly to 2.25, reflecting mainly a decrease in the number of National Party 
and independent winners. Changes in the effective numbers of parliamentary parties from 
one election to the next suggest some volatility, although the amount in this case is 
minimal. The election also revealed a decline in the ability of incumbents to win 
reelection. The drop is easy to explain: a triumphant Labor Party claimed many seats 
previously won by Coalition members. That said, the 2007 election showcases the way in 
which one-member district magnitudes amplify changes in seats without necessarily 
reflecting dramatic changes in the vote. The Labor Party was able to win 23 more seats 
with only a 5.7% increase in its first preference vote share. On the other side, the Liberal 
Party lost 19 seats while losing only 4.2% of first preference votes from 2004 to 2007. 
Cumulatively, the Electoral Volatility was only 6.5.  
Table 2.11—Volatility 2007 
Effective Number of 






2.25 69.3% 6.5 
 
To measure rootedness, we will again consider the success of independents and 
the amounts of personalistic elite behavior. Independents ran as frequently and performed 
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about as well in 2007 as 2004. While the number of independents per seat rose slightly to 
0.68, only two independent candidates won seats following incumbent Andren’s loss in 
the New South Wales seat of Calare. Within the elected parliamentary body, no 
politicians switched parties following the 2007 election. Personalistic elite behavior 
remained rare in Australia.   





















102 0.68 2 0 0 
 
Mechanics 
Preferences were instrumental in the 2007 election, rising to levels of nearly 
unprecedented frequency. While only eight elections changed hands based on preference 
exchanges, the ability of leading parties to maintain their leads should not be assumed as 
a given or viewed as an inconsequential result. Just as in 2004, the Labor -Green alliance 
proved more effective than the incumbent Coalition. The Labor Party won all eight seats 
that changed hands from the leader after first preference counting, each at the expense of 
the Coalition. Without those eight seats, the Labor Party’s majority in the government 

















Winner initially in 
2nd or worse after 
first count 
75/150 (50%) 75/150 (50%) 51.0% 8/75 (10.7%) 
 
Table 2.14—Preference Success by Party 2007 
Alliance Seats Won Leads 
Maintained 





65 32 8 0 
Challengers 
(ALP-Greens) 




2 1 0 0 
 
2010 Election 
 The 2010 Australian federal election produced one of the closest results in the 
nation’s history and a hung parliament. Two new party leaders competed in the election: 
Julia Gillard for Labor and Tony Abbott for the Coalition. The Australian electorate 
viewed both with a measure of distrust, signifying a break from the John Howard and 
Kevin Rudd era of greater public support for party leaders. Experts have indicated that 
the two mainstay issues of health and the economy reigned supreme again in 2010, yet 
because each party claimed a dominant public perception in one but not the other, neither 
side gained a clear advantage (Bean and McAllister, 2012). Gillard and Labor were 




For the first time, the Liberal-National alliance ran as a single party in one state, 
Queensland, making it impossible to clearly distinguish between the two parties’ vote and 
seat shares. For the purposes of this analysis, the two parties’ totals are cumulated under 
the title of the Liberal National Coalition. Despite earning above five percent more votes 
than Labor, the Coalition received only one more seat and was unable to form a 
government. Due to the preference voting system, the Green Party’s record 11.8% of the 
vote played a crucial pivot role in Labor’s victory, as well as securing the Green’s their 
first ever seat in the House. Other minor parties continued to lag behind.  
Table 2.15—Results by Party 2010 
Party Percentage of first-
preference votes 
Seats Won  
Liberal National Coalition11 43.6 72  
Labor Party 38 73  
Green Party 11.8 1  
Family First 2.3 0  
Christian Democrats 0.7 0  
One Nation 0.2 0  
Australian Democrats 0.2 0  
Others 3.3 4  
 
Alliances  
Depicting the alliances in the 2010 election is made extremely difficult due to the 
partial merger of the Liberal Party and the National Party in Queensland, coupled with 
the continued role of the Country Liberal Party in the Northern Territory. Additionally, in 
Western Australia, the National Party of Western Australia severed its formal 
                                                
11 Cumulative scores for Liberal Party, National Party, Liberal National Party 
Queensland, Country Liberal Party, and National Party WA.  
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connections with the Liberal Party and acted independently of the larger National Party.12  
In the majority of races, that is to say outside of Queensland and the Northern Territory, 
the Liberal Party and the National Party continued to exchange preferences when they 
each sponsored a candidate in the same district. Therefore, one alliance will be viewed as 
the Coalition bloc. On the other side, the Greens and Labor continued with their 
previously successful alliance. While some minor parties continued to make preference 
deals for Senate votes, there were no other formal deals for the lower house.  
Party System Institutionalization 
In 2010, the number of parties competing in the election rose slightly while the 
total number of candidates dropped. This was largely the result of the rapid decline of the 
Australian Democrats and the Citizens Electoral Council, who combined to field 130 
fewer candidates than in 2007. Like the previous two elections in the sample, the vast 










                                                
12 Depending on the source, National WA Member of Parliament Tony Crook was 
initially listed as a member of the Coalition or a crossbencher. Because Crook has 
formally sat with the National Party room since 2012, and rarely voted or behaved 
outside of Coalition norms prior to that point, he and the National WA party are included 
as part of the Coalition in this study.  
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Figure 2.3—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 2010 
 
Table 2.16—Party and Candidate Data 2010 
Total Number 
of Parties 
Average number of 
candidates per 
district 
Parties Entering Parties Exiting 
22 5.5 7 6 
 
Volatility measurements remained consistently low. Once again, the addition and 
subtraction of a handful of parties had little impact on the election. No Exiting Party had 
won seats in 2007, and no Entering Parties won seats, provided one does not consider the 

























6 0 7 32% 0 
 
As seen in Table 2.18, the 2010 election again favored incumbents, with 78% 
winning reelection. The small Electoral Volatility of 6.2 indicates that the parties 
performed at a relatively stable level compared with 2007. The effective number of 
parliamentary parties using the Laakso-Taagepera Index varies based on how the 
Coalition’s parties are counted. At its smallest, the effective number of parliamentary 
parties for 2010 is 2.12. Separating the National Party from the Liberal Party is much 
more difficult because of the 21 seats won by the Liberal National Party of Queensland. 
If the non-Queensland National Party members are separated from the Liberal Party plus 
the Queensland members, than the effective number of parliamentary parties increases to 
2.34.  
Table 2.18—Volatility 2010 






2.12/2.34 78.0% 6.2 
 
The number of independents contesting the 2010 election represented a decrease 
over previous years. Still, a high of four were elected, proving a crucial fulcrum in the 
formation of government following the hung parliament. Again, no members switched 
parties after being elected.   
                                                
13 Because it was a merger, Liberal National Queensland is not counted as a new party. 
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79 0.53 4 0 0 
 
Mechanics 
Despite the stability in electoral results, the use of preferences rose to 
unprecedented heights in the 2010 election. For only the second time, seats allocated 
through preferences outnumbered seats won outright. A total of eleven seats swung after 
preference counting, again countering the past claims that preference voting has no 
consequential impact on results. Again, this requires an impossible to prove 
counterfactual scenario where voters’ preferences do not change if the system were based 
on first past the post rules. Proportionally, this did not represent much of a change from 
the previous two elections under consideration. However, the ability of the Labor Party to 
overcome gaps in nine races while only losing two leads helped it catch up to the 
Coalition, which had a greater share of first preference votes on average.  









Winner initially in 
2nd or worse after 
first count 







Table 2.21—Preference Success by Party 2010 














4 2 0 1 
 
Discussion 
 From the above data, it is clear that the Australian party system is highly 
institutionalized. The supply of parties is stable, with the main competitors displaying 
consistency in both their coverage and their performance. Perhaps one reason that the 
number of competing parties in Australia is high, typically in the twenties, is the ease 
with which a party can form. Formation does not suggest much in the way of support, as 
only 1% of Australians belong to any political party, much less the minor ones that 
contest less than 20% of districts (Sawer, Abjorensen, Larkin, 2009, 6). The Australian 
party system is not volatile. While not quite static, after all the three elections under 
consideration produced one dramatic victory for each of the two main parties and a hung 
parliament, the actual percentages of the votes oscillate very slightly. Intermittent 
entering and exiting parties have no discernible effect on the electoral results. Finally, the 
Australian party system veers heavily towards party-oriented behavior and away from 
personalistic elites. Politicians are rigidly connected to their parties, with no Members of 
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Parliament changing parties and very little floor crossing beyond symbolic gestures 
(Parliament of Australia, 2006). 
 Despite previous claims to the contrary, preference voting does matter in 
Australia. In each election, the Labor-Green alliance was able to win at least 8 seats that 
otherwise would have gone to the Coalition parties. In 2010, those seats made the 
difference in which party formed the government. In 2007, the drastic advantage Labor 
earned would have otherwise been slashed to the slimmest of margins. The frequency 
with which preference votes were needed to determine a winner continued to increase, far 
surpassing historic averages from the 1950s through the 1990s (Reilly, 1997B; Hughes, 
1977, 292). Nevertheless, the actual percentage of seats going to candidates not initially 
in first place remains small, albeit potentially significant.  
 What can be determined about the frequency and strategy of Australian party 
preference alliances based on this information? As is clear, the basic two-party nature of 
the Australian lower house makes the Labor Party and the Coalition the biggest potential 
winners and losers in preference deals. The two parties seek significant minor party 
partners to trade second preferences. For the smaller parties, the rewards are reaped in the 
Senate elections, which are determined through a proportional preference process that 
massively increases the potential for gaining election for smaller parties. On occasion, as 
seen in 2010 with the Green Party, a minor party with a large enough initial vote share 
can benefit from preferences in the same manner as the two major parties. For Green MP 
Adam Bandt from Melbourne district, a slight deficit proved surmountable using 
preferences. Most small parties make preference deals for Senate seats, even if they do 
not have preference trades formalized for House elections. The comparative nature of this 
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project omits these Senate-only preference trades from consideration for two reasons: 
first, the Senate system uses Single Transferable Vote, and secondly, the other two 
countries in the sample are unicameral.  
 A word of caution is in order. Preference flows in Australia never reach 
unanimous levels between two allied parties. Australian voters ultimately control their 
ballots, and some do not mark the candidates in the manner suggested by their preferred 
parties’ How to Vote card. Still, since a majority of Australian voters report using the 
How to Vote cards, the alliances struck by parties are significant for serious study (Reilly, 
1997B). There are also flows between parties that occur independently of formal deals or 
mutually beneficial pacts. Because voting in Australia is compulsory, and because 
preferences are used whether or not parties make alliances, preferences must be marked 
for all ballots. Some party supporters’ first preference ballots are therefore consistently 
directed towards ideologically similar second preference parties, even if no reciprocal 
directive has been issued. This could occur from individual voters ranking the parties or 
from the parties filling out How to Vote cards in ideologically consistent ways. 
Undocumented handshake deals between parties are also common, but have not been 
listed as alliances in this study.  
 Categorizing the Liberal-National partnership also necessitates second-guessing. 
The two parties compete against each other in only a small percentage of districts in each 
election within the sample. In the rest of the districts, one or the other fields a candidate. 
For that reason, it might seem unreasonable to list the partnership as an alliance, without 
the presence of another party such as Family First in 2004, because the exchange of 
preferences in House of Representative districts infrequently materializes. However, the 
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fact that some Liberal and National candidates do compete against each other is enough 
to list the alliance. Additionally, the alliance exists as a tangible fact, cemented even 
further by the parties’ cooperation in Senate elections and House government formation. 
The strategy enlisted by the two parties, to not compete against each other like Greens 
and Labor do, is testimony to the strength of the alliance, even if it seems to fly in the 
face of the original purposes of preference voting. Whether or not the strategy is 
particularly successful, or hindered by the lack of a viable additional minority partner in 
recent years, is up for debate.  
 To conclude, the Australian party system institutionalization appears to structure 
the frequency and type of formal preference alliances. Additionally, preference trades are 
both oft utilized and potentially rewarding, or destructive, to a party’s electoral chances. 
A stable party system, combined with preference voting rules, has made pre-election 
alliances between parties rational and vital. For these reasons, the recent Australian 
experience with Alternative Vote suggests that the system typically appears, at the 
parliamentary level, as exclusionary as first past the post models. However, the actual 
path to reach winning thresholds in some districts requires cooperative party behavior 
that includes minor party policies in the major party platforms. Furthermore, the 2010 
example of the Green Party’s single seat serving as a crucial pivot in Labor’s eventual 
ability to form a coalition indicates that the potential for third parties to win a small 
number of seats could prove crucial towards government formation under certain 
circumstances. In this way, Lijphart’s views on the majoritarian nature of AV are perhaps 
too harsh. As will be seen in the remaining two cases, the stability and consistency of 







Chapter Three: Fiji 
 
Rivalries of many kinds dot Fiji’s contentious political history: between islands, 
between hierarchical elites, and between ethnic groups. Democratic practices have served 
to refocus those rivalries onto political parties and formal institutions, rather than 
dissolving them in favor of ideological and policy debates. Frequent anti-democratic 
coups have challenged the legitimacy of elected officials and taken Fiji through turbulent 
patches of autocratic rule.  
Much of the context for Fiji’s political turmoil dates to colonial practices from a 
century of British rule. British officials rigidified a formerly fluid stratified society, 
positioning compliant regional chiefs as unquestioned hereditary rulers over Fijian 
affairs. In an effort to boost economic production without disturbing traditional notions of 
Fijian life, the British government undertook a massive labor importation program. 
Beginning in 1879, indentured Indian workers arrived in Fiji to work on sugar plantations 
that were owned by Australian and British firms. Through the indenture system, 
economic production rapidly increased while over eighty percent of the land remained in 
Fijian control (Denoon, 1997).  
When the British reformed their colonial policies after World War I to allow 
slightly more local input, indigenous Fijians and British colonial leaders advocated 
separate racial representation. The growing Indo-Fijian population sought a common roll. 
Even though indentured labor ended in 1916, the Indo-Fijian community had a higher 
growth rate than indigenous Fijians and quickly became a slight majority in the islands 
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(Bennett, 1994, 44). Throughout the colonial period, the Fijian-British alliance for 
racially based representation won out, as British leadership prioritized Fijian interest over 
Indian desires, despite, or perhaps because of, the economic and numerical superiority of 
the Indo-Fijians.  
 The decolonization process began in Fiji in 1960, in the midst of the massive 
wave of independence movements worldwide. Fiji’s independence constitution 
formalized a Westminster-style system and ethnic voting, allocating 12 reserved seats 
each in the House of Representatives for representatives chosen exclusively by Indo-
Fijians and Fijians, and 3 to the General population.14  In addition to the 27 communal 
seats, 25 national seats were strictly allocated according to the ethnicity of candidates (10 
Indo-Fijian, 10 Fijian, 5 General). In total, each individual voted four times—once for an 
ethnic representative and three for racially defined national seats (Macdonald, 1994). 
Party politics in Fiji has largely revolved around race since independence. The 
two major political parties of the early post-independence period were “essentially race-
based . . . in time, virtually every issue of public policy came to be viewed through racial 
lenses” (Lal, 2003, 336). Race maintained its institutional presence, incorporated openly 
in government programs and classification systems (Larson and Aminzade, 2009). Most 
importantly, the Fijian military is almost exclusively ethnic Fijian and the Fijian Great 
Council of Chiefs holds veto power over all legislation concerning Fijian affairs. 
 After two decades of relatively stable rule, mostly under the right wing Fijian 
Alliance led by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Fiji’s democracy rapidly crumbled in 1987. A 
                                                
14 General signifies the remainder of Fiji’s population, historically a mixture of Chinese, 
European, and Australian immigrants.  
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left wing Labour led government, composed primarily of Indian politicians but headed by 
the Fijian Timoci Bavadra, won free and fair elections but was rapidly toppled in a 
military coup. The coup’s leaders installed the Fijian Sitiveni Rabuka as the leader of an 
interim government charged by Fijian elites with protecting Fijian political interests. The 
coup capitalized on an undercurrent of doubt among a portion of the ethnic Fijian 
population in the ability of democracy to ensure fair ethnic treatment. Scholars suggest 
that this fear is ultimately rooted in Fijian desire to protect the status quo on land 
ownership and executive authority (Kumar and Prasad, 2004). Ironically, it was Rabuka’s 
vehemently Fijian government that paved the way for electoral reforms designed to bring 
the state’s two ethnic groups closer together.  
AV History and Responses in Fiji 
Sitiveni Rabuka’s government openly championed racial segregation, drawing the 
ire of the international community and Fiji’s most important external funding sources 
(Lal, 2002; Kumar and Prasad, 2004). The interim 1990 Constitution required all Fijians 
to vote once in an ethnically reserved district, virtually legislating a 37-27 Fijian political 
majority over their Indian counterparts (Fraenkel, 2000). Opposition parties grew more 
vocal as pressure mounted from outside Fiji, most prominently manifested in the 
Commonwealth’s decision to expel Fiji. In response, Rabuka initiated a Constitutional 
Review Commission (CRC) to propose potential amendments to the 1990 Constitution.  
The three-member CRC proposed a number of changes to Fiji’s political system.  
The Australian-influenced Alternative Vote was chosen for the electoral system in an 
effort to encourage multi-ethnic government, stable political parties, and incentivize 
moderation and cross-ethnic collaboration. The commission’s panel viewed AV as the 
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best way to reward pre-election conciliation and vote-pooling strategies (Lal, 2002, 281). 
Furthermore, the CRC recommended that voters be able to vote for candidates outside of 
their own ethnicity. To this end, the CRC suggested 45 seats from 15 three-member 
heterogeneous constituencies and 25 single-member communal constituencies.  
Somewhat surprisingly, Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei Party 
(SVT) teamed with the Indian-backed National Federation Party (NFP) to champion the 
review process, while maintaining the power to edit the recommendations. Ultimately, 
the Fijian Parliament accepted the Alternative Vote reform but went against the CRC in 
mandating power sharing in the cabinet for all parties above a minimum seats threshold. 
The government furthermore edited the construction of constituencies, preserving 46 
communal seats and adding 25 open ones, all with single-member magnitude (Stockwell, 
2005).15 Geographic imbalance favors rural Fijians over their urban counterparts 
(Fraenkel, 2000, 90). The result is a preferential voting system with distinct ethnic 
restrictions.  
Initial commentary on the Alternative Vote system in Fiji quickly acknowledged 
the significance preference transfers have played in determining the makeup of the 
government. Especially in the 1999 election, as will be discussed below, preferences 
were frequently used and often required multiple eliminations prior to a winning 
candidate reaching 50% of the vote (Fraenkel, 2001). Compared to Fiji’s previous FPTP 
system, the AV model has increased the role of small parties (Kumar and Prasad, 2004). 
Much of the early analysis looked at the nature of preference transfer flows. Parties 
                                                
15 The 46 Communal seats were allocated as follows: 23 Fijian, 19 Indian, 3 General, and 
1 Rotuman Islander.  
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appeared to come to different conclusions on strategy—some sought ideological allies, 
others aimed to avoid splitting votes, and a distinct section chose to allocate their second 
and third preferences to long shots rather than major competition (Fraenkel, 2001).  
Some experts launched vociferous critiques of the AV system after the initial 
election in 1999. The disproportionality of results under AV came under fire, as a party 
with less than a majority of the votes earned a clear majority of the seats. The ideology of 
that party, therefore, potentially loomed as a threat to any collaborative multiethnic 
process envisioned by the CRC reforms (Fraenkel, 2001, 19).  Robert Stockwell has gone 
as far as to claim AV harmed moderation efforts through its disproportionality 
(Stockwell, 2005, 383). His analysis is based on the majority of preferences flowing from 
moderate to radical parties in the 1999 and 2001 elections. 
Donald Horowitz, the foremost proponent of the Alternative Vote and a leading 
contributor to the CRC’s information-gathering efforts, vehemently counters many of 
these early criticisms. Horowitz sees the 1999 election as a vindication of the cross-ethnic 
collaborative incentives resulting from the Alternative Vote. As proof, he cites the more 
than 80% of second preference transfers in the 25 open seats that were interethnic 
(Horowitz, 2006, 656). He also disputes having made any claims that AV always fosters 
moderate results; instead contending that AV favors moderation without uniformity 
(Horowitz, 2006, 653). Horowitz still disputes the claim that the 1999 elections were a 
defeat for moderation. Rather than casting the winning parties as radical, he views the 
defeated incumbent SVT as the radical for its prominent role in the 1987 coup and 1990 
Constitution. To Horowitz, Fijian parties responded strategically to the new incentives, 
and many saw something to gain from moderate cross-ethnic partnerships, thus 
 
 57 
vindicating the AV system (Horowitz, 2006). Kumar and Prasad agree, suggesting that all 
parties can manipulate the system but the actual skill with which each party does so 
depends on the year. As parties’ initial vote share ebbs and flows, different strategic 
combinations hold more potential than others (Kumar and Prasad, 2004).  
Turning now to the three elections held under the Alternative Vote model, a 
clearer picture emerges of how Fiji’s uncertain party system played a role in the nature 
and utility of preferences.  
The 1999 Election 
Results 
Fiji’s first experience under the Alternative Vote model produced a significant 
upset. The Fijian Labour Party, whose stronghold lies predominantly in the rural Indian 
community, defeated the favored incumbents; the Fijian SVT and the Indian supported 
National Federation Party. The FLP turned less than one-third of first preference votes 
into an outright majority of seats in the Parliament. Conversely, the SVT earned one-fifth 
of the initial vote but won only eleven percent of the seats. Even more harshly, the NFP 
failed to win a seat despite nearly 15% of the vote, while the Fiji Association Party 











Table 3.1—Results by Party 1999 
Party Percentage of first-
preference votes 
Seats Won  
Fiji Labour Party 32.2% 37 
Fiji Association Party 9.5% 10 
Sokosoko ni 
Vakuvalewa ni Taukei 
(SVT) 
20.6% 8 






Nationalist Vanua Tako 
Lavo Party (NVTLP) 
4.4% 2 




Others 3.6% 5 
 
 The seemingly contradictory results have their roots in Fiji’s three principle 
electoral divisions. In the 19 Indian reserved districts, the FLP completely dominated an 
essentially two-party race against the NFP, winning all of the seats. In the 23 Fijian 
reserved districts, the FLP unsurprisingly failed to win a single seat. However, instead of 
an SVT landslide, a muddled picture emerged with five Fijian parties winning at least one 
seat, led by the FAP with 9 and the SVT with 5. FLP impressively dominated in the 
crowded Open districts, even in many that lacked an ethnic Indian majority. By winning 
18 of the 25 Open seats, many from preferences, the FLP managed a shocking rout of the 
1999 election.  
 Further explanation for the results lies in the SVT’s fall from near unanimous 
Fijian support. Regional disputes led to a surge in provincial ethnic Fijian parties that 
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eroded the SVT’s Fijian vote share. The FLP was able to successfully label their chief 
intra-ethnic rival, the NFP, as collaborators with the incumbent SVT regime, which had 
sought to limit Indian political and land-owning rights on a systematic level. By allying 
with the SVT, Jai Ram Reddy and the NFP partnered with the party that many Indians 
associated with the 1987 coup, an event that had overthrown a legitimately elected 
Indian-dominated government (Fraenkel, 2000).  
Alliances  
As mentioned above, the incumbent alliance between the SVT and the NFP was 
forged well prior to the 1999 election. Joining them was the United General Party, a 
minor party that competed in only six races and focused overwhelmingly on Fiji’s 
General voters who have three reserved seats. The Fijian Labour Party partnered with two 
ethnic Fijian parties, the Fijian Association Party and the Party of National Unity 
(PANU). Fraenkel suggests that the FLP-led alliance came together solely to defeat the 
SVT and lacked any ideological cohesion (Fraenkel, 2000, 104). However, Horowitz 
maintains there were moderate elements in the FLP and FAP leadership, while the PANU 
had a long history of cross-ethnic policies befitting its name (Horowitz, 2006, 657). The 
remaining parties, most prominently the Fijian-backed Christian Democratic Alliance 
(VLV) and Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP) refused to partner with either 
the Indian FLP or their Fijian rival, the SVT.  
Party System Institutionalization  
No single party had the ability to realistically compete in each race in 1999. While 
there was nothing legally stopping the FLP or SVT, for example, from contesting seats in 
the opposing communal constituencies, the chances of success were slim. The Indian FLP 
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earned less than 2% of the vote in Fijian districts and ran in only four races. The SVT did 
not put up a single candidate in the Indian districts. The result is a party size spectrum 
that is empty at the universal end of the scale. The largest parties contested seats in their 
communal arena plus the open seats, while ten smaller parties focused specifically on 
individual islands or districts. Exiting Parties and Entering Parties, the other aspect to the 
stability dimension in determining party system institutionalization, will not be 
considered for the 1999 election. Because the preferential system was brand new, making 
comparisons between the 1994 election, conducted under the FPTP method, and the 1999 
election obscures the monumental electoral and constitutional changes that occurred as a 
result of the 1997 Constitution. 
Figure 3.1—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 1999 
 
Table 3.2—Party and Candidate Data 1999 





  Similarly to the measurements for Exiting Parties and Entering Parties, it is 
difficult to accurately assess the volatility of the 1999 results. Electoral Volatility, 
measured through Pedersen’s Index, is a much more accurate rating when voter 
participation is consistent. Fiji’s 1997 Constitution instituted compulsory voting, which 
bumped Fiji’s percentage of participating registered voters from 72.4% to 90.1% 
(Fraenkel, 2000, 89). The best measure of volatility is therefore the Laakso-Taagepera 
Index for the effective number of parliamentary parties. For 1999, the effective size of the 
Fijian system was 3.18, suggesting a grouping of lesser-represented parties beyond the 
dominant FLP. 
 For the first election under the Alternative Vote model, parties dominated in the 
ways envisioned by the Constitution’s advocates. Independent candidates ran in about 
one-third of the contests, and five were elected. Of those five, three were from the 
minority communal General and Rotuman districts, which do not have nearly the same 
support of either the FLP or SVT as the rest of Fiji’s constituencies. Party discipline also 
reigned supreme. No politicians switched parties in the aftermath of the 1999 election.  














24 0.34 5 0 
 
Mechanics 
Viewing Table 3.4, it is obvious that preferences were of massive importance to 
the 1999 election. A majority of the elections used preferences to determine winners, and 
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a robust 17 out of 36 featured a come-from-behind victory. The ability to successfully 
strategize preference transfers proved key to the FLP’s victory.   










Winner initially in 
2nd or worse after 
first count 
35/71 (49.3%) 36/71 (50.7%) 48.3% 17/36 (47.2%) 
 
The FLP won 24 seats (19 Indian, 5 Open) outright. They held on to ten leads and 
overcame three deficits. Taking as a whole, the FLP-FAP-PANU alliance was able to 
maintain 15 out of 18 leads and overcome 10 deficits. On the other hand, the SVT-NFP-
UGP alliance managed to maintain only 3 out of 16 leads and overcame only one deficit. 
Even non-allied parties faired better than the incumbent group, as several independents, 
VLV, and NVTLP winners were initially trailing at the first count.  
Table 3.5—Preference Success by Party 1999 
Alliance Seats Won Leads 
Maintained 














10 1 1 6 
 
 According to Jon Fraenkel’s calculations, the FLP won 24 of its 37 seats without 
help from other parties. They won eight more solely on transfers from their partners, 
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either the FAP or PANU. The remaining five seats, valuable enough to push the FLP over 
the edge to a majority government, came partly from transfers from the non-allied Fijian 
parties, the VLV and NVTLP. These parties placed the FLP slightly ahead of the SVT, 
most likely due to a strong desire to root out their ethnic rivals from their position in 
government (Fraenkel, 2001, 20-22).  
 One of the SVT’s major strategic mistakes was their tactic to avoid running 
candidates in many of the same seats as the NFP. Partially as a result, the lowered 
popularity of both parties was certainly a factor as well, the incumbent alliance had little 
reliable transfer of preferences, as they had avoided having two closely allied parties 
together in the same constituency.  
2001 Election 
Despite its dominant performance in the 1999 election, the FLP lacked the ability to 
govern smoothly. The coalition of the FLP, FAP, and PANU steadily disintegrated as it 
became obvious that the FLP could govern without the Fijian parties’ help. The Fijian 
parties reevaluated their position in the wake of vocal criticism of their role in electing an 
Indian-dominated government. Old tensions between Fijian land-holding interests and 
democratic processes flared again. Most importantly, the FLP failed to gain any support 
from key Fijian institutions—the Great Council of Chiefs, the Fijian military, and the 
Fijian police (Kumar and Prasad, 2004). In 2000, George Speight, an ethno-nationalist 
Fijian, led an armed coup against the FLP and the government as a whole. Speight and 
his supporters actually held the government hostage in the Parliament building for about 
a month. After military intervention and a court decision to reinstate the 1997 
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Constitution condemned by Speight and his political allies, new elections were held in 
2001. 
Results  
The 2001 election marked the rise of a new force in Fijian politics. The Soqosoqo 
ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), led by Laisenia Qarase, displaced the SVT as the 
preeminent Fijian party. In general, the SDL represented former elements of the Christian 
Democratic Alliance and discontented former supporters of the SVT. Openly against the 
1999 Constitution, the SDL balanced between rejection of Speight’s coup’s methods and 
support for its pro-Fijian principles. After receiving the endorsement of the Great Council 
of Chiefs, the party earned a thorough victory in heavily ethnic Fijian areas. As can be 
seen in Table 3.6, the SDL won the most seats despite trailing the FLP in the overall 
percentage of first preferences. With six seats, the new radical Matanitu Vanua (MV) 
headed a group of four parties winning small representation in the government. Rather 
shockingly, former coup leader and prisoner George Speight ran under the MV platform 













Table 3.6—Results by Party 2001 
Party Percentage of first-
preference votes 
Seats Won 
Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua (SDL) 
26.1% 32 
Fiji Labour Party 34.8% 27 
Matanitu Vanua (MV) 9.9% 6 
New Labour Unity Party 4.5% 2 
National Federation Party 10.1% 1 
United General Party 0.5% 1 
Soqosoqo ni Vakuvalewa ni 
Taukei (SVT) 
5.4% 0 
Bai Kei Viti (BKV) 2.2% 0 
Party of National Unity 
(PANU) 
1.1% 0 
Fijian Association Party 1.3% 0 
Nationalist Vanua Tako 
Lavo Party (NVTLP) 
0.6% 0 
Others 3.5% 2 
 
 The SDL’s victory emerged from its dominance in the Fijian communal seats and 
its strong performance in the Open constituencies. SDL won 18 of the 23 Fijian seats, 
with the other 5 going to the MV. All 19 Indian seats went to the FLP, who maintained a 
fifty percent gap over the NFP. The race therefore diverged only in the Open seats, where 
the SDL won 13 of 25 compared to 8 for the FLP.16 All but one of the SDL’s Open seat 
victories required preference voting, indicating the importance of preference transfers in 
the final result. Unlike 1999, the majority of the preference transfers were intra-ethnic 
(Horowitz, 2007).  
Alliances  
Two alliances contested the 2001 election, while the winning SDL party relied on 
semi-frequent transfers from non-allied parties. The FLP partnered with PANU for a 
                                                
16 The SDL also won 1 seat in a General constituency.  
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second time, but no longer could count on second preferences from the FAP. FAP joined 
the self-proclaimed Moderate’s Alliance, also consisting of the multiethnic triumvirate of 
NFP-SVT-UGP from the 1999 election, in addition to the National Labour Unity Party 
that had broken away from the FLP. The SDL forwent the formal alliance process.  
Party System Institutionalization 
 Shifts in the Fijian party system underscored the 2001 election. The SDL emerged 
as the first national party, even contesting seats in 7 of the 19 Indian districts, despite 
predictably horrible results of less than a quarter of a percent of the Indian vote. The 
Indian-dominated FLP and the breakaway NLUP also tried to compete in the Fijian 
districts. A middle tier of parties, the NFP, MV, and SVT targeted select Open seats and a 
large portion of their communal ones. Ten provincial parties rounded out the group of 18. 
Despite the increase in the number of parties, the average number of candidates per 
district remained slightly below five. Rarely did all six of the larger parties contest a 
single seat.  




Table 3.7—Party and Candidate Data 2001 
Total Number 
of Parties 







18 4.9 8 6 
 
 Because 2001 was the second election under the Alternative Vote model, we can 
now examine the impact of new parties and the loss of old ones. The six Exiting Parties 
had no parliamentary power from 1999. Three of the eight new parties, the SDL, MV, 
and NLUP, won representation in 2001. Collectively, new parties counted for a majority 
of the seats in the 2001 Parliament.  
Table 3.8—Exiting Parties and Entering Parties 2001 
Number of 
Exiting Parties 









Parties in total 
number of 
parties 
Seats won by 
Entering 
Parties 
6 0 8 44.4% 40 
 
Given the rapid rise of the SDL, it is unsurprising that the 2001 election was 
highly volatile in its results. A steep 46.1 rating in the Pedersen’s Index shows how much 
of the vote changed from 1999 to 2001. Incumbents also faired very poorly, with only 
19.7% of the 2001 MPs having served in 1999. The decline of the SVT, the rise of the 
SDL, and the SDL’s ability to out-compete the FLP for preferences in the Open seats 
explains these numbers. The strong two-party nature of the results, with the FLP and the 
SDL accounting for 59 of the 71 seats is revealed in the effective number of political 




Table 3.9—Volatility 2001 








2.81 19.7% 46.1 
 
 Personalistic elite behavior remained rare. Independent candidates had little effect 
on the 2001 election. Only 21 contested seats, and of those there were two winners, one 
in a General seat and the other in an Open seat. Three incumbent members of Parliament 
were reelected under a new party banner. In the aftermath of the election, zero MPs 
switched parties.  





















21 0.3 2 3 0 
  
Mechanics 
Preferences were still significant in determining the 2001 results, although the 
overall frequency of preference use dropped to less than half of races. Similarly, 35.7% 
of the preference-using races saw a defeat of the initial leader, down from 1999 but 

















Winner initially in 
2nd or worse after 
first count 
43/71 (60.5%) 28/71 (39.5%) 55.5% 10/28 (35.7%) 
 
 From Table 3.12, it is clear that the SDL (listed as a non-allied party) managed to 
gain a number of seats from preference exchanges. The FLP’s losses in preference races 
came primarily from the rankings of Fijian parties, who preferenced the SDL slightly 
above the FLP. The Indian-dominated NFP also favored the SDL, crossing the ethnic line 
in an effort to help defeat their prime competitor (Horowitz, 2006). Contrary to many of 
the predictions about the Alternative Vote model, therefore, the non-allied SDL was able 
to benefit from the system without making inter-ethnic accommodations to its policies 
(Stockwell, 2005). The SDL received a steady flow of preferences from the Moderate’s 
Alliance when faced with a choice between the Fijian SDL and the Indian FLP. After the 
election, the SDL turned to the MV to form a coalition government of Fijian parties. The 
FLP took up ranks heading the opposition. Perhaps the single most important takeaway 
from the 2001 election was that a non-fractured Fijian party spectrum, buoyed by the 
dominant performance of the SDL on first preferences, could virtually guarantee Fijian 









Table 3.12—Preference Success by Party 2001 
Alliance Seats Won Leads 
Maintained 










4 1 0 2 
Non-Allied 
Parties  




After five years of SDL rule, Fiji returned to the polls in 2006. Once again, the 
SDL defeated the FLP by five seats. This time, however, the SDL combined its 
parliamentary victory with an electoral one as well, winning 5.4% more of the first-
preference votes and full control over the government. Only the UPP, a re-branded 
version of the United General Party, and two independents joined the two major parties in 
office. The absorption of the MV into the SDL eliminated any sizable competition to the 












Table 3.13—Results by Party 2006 
Party Percentage of first-
preference votes 
Seats Won 
SDL 44.6% 36 
Fiji Labor Party 39.2% 31 
United People’s Party 0.8% 2 
National Federation Party 6.2% 0 
National Alliance Party of Fiji 2.9% 0 
Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo 
Party (NVTLP) 
0.5% 0 
SVT < 0.1% 0 
Party of National Unity 
(PANU) 
0.8% 0 
Others 4.9% 2 
 
 The 2006 election featured a clear divide in party dominance based on communal 
identity. The SDL won all 23 Fijian seats and the FLP won all 19 Indian seats. The two 
parties dominated similarly in their respective strongholds (Lal, 2007). The FLP won 
79.9% of the vote in the Indian seats with the SDL only one-tenth of a percent worse in 
the Fijian constituencies.  Independents and the United People’s Party divided the 
General seats evenly. That left the 25 Open seats to decide the election. The SDL won 13 
to the FLP’s 12, with 44.1% of the first preferences compared to 40.0%.  
Alliances 
Unlike 2001, the SDL entered into alliances for the 2006 election. Its partners 
were the NVTLP and the SVT. These two parties, combined, contested only twelve seats. 
In reality, the SDL went into the race without firm guarantees of second preferences in 
most races. On the opposing side, the FLP entered into alliance with four smaller parties: 
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the new National Alliance Party of Fiji (NAPF), the rebranded UPP, traditional allies 
PANU, and the single-candidate Justice and Freedom Party.  
Party System Institutionalization 
The stability of the Fijian system continued to evolve in 2006. Only four parties 
sponsored more than 11 candidates, but each of those four ran in at least 45 races. 
Previously mid-sized parties continued to shrink, with some disappearing entirely. The 
SVT had only one candidate, compared to 35 in 2001 and 46 in 1999. The average 
number of candidates remained similar to past years, 4.7, while the total number of 
parties shrank to 13. Two parties new to the scene in 2001, the MV and the NLUP, did 
not contest in 2006 despite winning seats in 2001. The MV merged into the SDL in early 
2006 prior to the election. The small BKV regional party merged with PANU, while the 
NLUP, VLV, and FAP merged into the National Alliance Party of Fiji, a new party that 
contested 48 seats. If we adjust Table 3.14 to reflect mergers as distinct from Exiting 
Parties, than only three parties exited the system. Similarly, if we treat brand new parties 
as conceptually different from parties that existed prior to 2001 but did not contest the 







                                                
17 The United People’s Party is not listed as an Entering Party, and neither is the United 





Figure 3.3—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 2006 
 
Table 3.14—Party and Candidate Data 2006 
Total Number of 
Parties 
Average number of 
candidates per district 




13 4.7 4 8 
 
 Table 3.15 shows the performance of the Entering Parties in 2006 and Exiting 
Parties in 2001. As explained above, the eight Exiting Party seats belonged to now-
merged parties. The Entering Parties made little impact on the 2006 election.18 In fact, 
outside of the FLP and SDL, no other party won more than two seats. Combined, the two 
major parties won 67 of the 71 seats, reflected in the Laakso-Taagepera Index 




                                                
18 The NAPF is listed as a new party because its creation predated the incorporation of 
the VLV, FAP, and breakaway members of the SVT.  
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Parties in total 
number of 
parties 
Seats won by 
Entering 
Parties 
8 (5) 8 (8) 4 30.8% 0 
 
 
 The 2006 election featured a dramatic reduction in volatility and an increase in 
the ability of incumbents to secure reelection. The Pedersen’s Index dropped severely to 
14.5. This number includes the smaller of two merged parties, such as the MV for 
example, as part of the larger, the SDL in this case, for both elections. This is in keeping 
with the arguments of Allan Sikk on how to most accurately measure volatility (Sikk, 
2005). Much of the remaining volatility came from the gains made by the SDL and the 
FLP at the expense of previously mid-sized parties.  
Table 3.16—Volatility 2006 







2.23 46.5 14.5 
 
Personalistic elite behavior became much more common in 2006. The number of 
independent candidates more than tripled, as 67 contested seats. Still, only two were 
actually victorious. As in 2001, three incumbent MPs won reelection under a new party 
                                                
19 Includes the smaller party in a merger as an Exiting Party. 
 




banner. All three switched to the SDL, two from the MV and one former independent. No 
politicians switched parties in the aftermath of the election, although this is a difficult 
variable to trust completely because a coup, discussed further below, overthrew the 
democratic system entirely less than a year after the election.  





















67 0.94 2 3 0 
 
Mechanics  
Preference voting did not play nearly as large of a role in 2006 as it had in 1999 or 
even 2001. Only ten seats required using second preferences in the determination of a 
winner, and only two actually changed hands. Put in other words, 69 of Fiji’s 71 seats 
would have gone to the same candidate under a FPTP system, provided voters would not 
have recalculated their preferences. Looking at Table 3.18, victorious candidates earned 
an amazingly high 69.5% of the initial vote. From the results of the election it is apparent 
that the SDL and FLP won in landslides in the communal seats, leaving only the Open 
constituencies. 10 of the 25 Open seats required preferences, but the parties were, on the 
whole, able to hang on to the leads they built.  










Winner initially in 
2nd or worse after 
first count 
61/71 (85.9%) 10/71 (14.1%) 69.5% 2/10 (20%) 
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Table 3.19—Preference Success by Party 2006 
Alliance Seats Won Leads 
Maintained 














2 1 0 1 
  
Scholarly commentary on the 2006 Election has been rare due to the importance of 
dramatic events occurring less than a year after the race was over. In December of 2006, 
a long-simmering feud between the SDL’s Laisenia Qarase and the head of the Fijian 
military, Commodore Frank Bainimarama exploded. Bainimarama and the armed forces 
overthrew the SDL and suspended the Fijian Parliament. Commodore Bainimarama 
refused to accept Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase’s policies on past coup actors 
(particularly lenient treatment of George Speight’s closest allies), indigenous land reform, 
and racial politics. At the core of the issue was a debate over who had higher authority, 
the democratically elected SDL, led by Qarase, or the Fijian military, led by 
Bainimarama. In rebuking the 2000 coup’s perpetrators, as well as the ethnically Fijian 
government, Bainimarama’s coup had the unprecedented effect of overthrowing Fijian 
elites and challenging pro-Fijian policies, despite Bainimarama and the military’s Fijian 
ethnicity. Fiji has not had democratic elections since 2006, and Bainimarama’s roadmap 
to democracy unabashedly pledges to end the Alternative Vote system and communal 
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voting because of their perceived role in institutionalizing racial tensions (Ramesh, 
2010).  
Discussion 
Fiji’s political system evolved considerably over the course of the three 
preferential voting elections from 1999 to 2006. The trends were not unidirectional. The 
results should also be taken as general trends rather than hard and fast rules. With only 
three elections, the ability to draw clear conclusions from preference voting in Fiji is 
limited.  
For the first dimension of party system institutionalization, Fiji saw an ultimate 
increase in the stability of its party supply, notwithstanding increased provincialism.  
Initially, the party supply looked to be growing increasingly unstable under the 
preference-voting model. Ultimately, however, party numbers decreased while the major 
parties fielded more and more candidates.  However, much of the 2001 turmoil in terms 
of the success of new parties amounted to the replacement of the SVT by the SDL as the 
dominant force in Fijian politics. Rather than a split, the rise of the SDL signified a 
transition that actually coalesced the Fijian electorate.  
Volatility is the most difficult of the dimensions to succinctly depict for Fiji. The 
arrival of the SDL and the downfall of the SVT caused major upheaval in incumbent 
reelection rates and measurements of Electoral Volatility between 1999 and 2001. 
However, the period between 2001 and 2006 was much less volatile, perhaps reflecting 
an entrenchment of the two main parties and greater consistency from the electorate in 
the face of more stable party supply.  This is, of course, a guess. Without more elections, 
it is hard to draw clear conclusions from one shift in volatility. Importantly, the 
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introduction of compulsory voting simultaneous with the new preferential voting both 
increased and subsequently stabilized the number of registered voters (Fraenkel, 2000). 
This makes it more likely that the observed results reflect continuity in voter behavior 
rather than a sizable shift in who is voting.  
By the 2006 election, two dominant parties had emerged as national forces. The 
SDL’s and FLP’s control over their communal constituencies was so dominant, winning 
over 79% of the Fijian and Indian vote respectively in 2006, that it is reasonable to 
conclude that Fiji was approaching a crystallized two party structure under the alternative 
vote. The remaining parties competed in two fashions: as a second choice in one 
communal group plus select open seats, or as a small regional party. Of the two groups, 
the small parties had greater success, especially those catering to the General and 
Rotuman Islander category of voters. Midsized and small parties faced a choice: merge 
with the dominant parties, form a large party among themselves, or cease operations. The 
steady drop in the Laakso-Taagepera Index, from 3.18 in 1999 down to 2.23 in 2006 
indicates the eroding parliamentary presence of the midsized and minor parties.  
While the supply stability dimension of Fiji’s party system shifted towards 
slightly higher degrees of institutionalization, the moderate increase in personalistic elite 
behavior indicates slightly less institutionalization along the rootedness dimension. The 
tripling of independent candidates, while the overall number of candidates held relatively 
steady, reveals a growing willingness of elites to seek office without party support. 
However, the success of those independent politicians did not change over the three-
election sample. Furthermore, personalistic elite behavior measured by politicians 
switching parties was rare. Of the six MPs who won reelection with new parties, 2 had 
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previously run for parties that no longer existed at the next election. Overall, Fiji’s party 
system remained well rooted.  
Preferential voting played an important role, albeit decreasingly, in determining 
the winners in the three Fijian elections. The 1999 election required preference exchanges 
in half the seats, and in half of those races the initial leader ended up losing the contest. In 
2001, preferences were used in almost 40% of races with a little more than a third of 
those seats changing during the preference count. Finally, the 2006 election featured far 
more uncompetitive races. Preferences were only used ten times, and only twice did the 
eventual winner make up an initial deficit.  
Parties in Fiji have a massive role in the exchange of preferences. Unlike 
Australia, which only allows parties to offer their followers How to Vote cards with 
suggested orderings, Fijian parties have direct control over preference flows. Fijian 
ballots have an Above the Line feature, which allows the voter to check their first choice 
party and simply turn in the ballot. In this case, the parties then dictate the flow of 
preferences according to rankings published prior to the election (Fraenkel, 2004). 
According to studies of the 1999 and 2001 elections, approximately 95% of voters chose 
the Above the Line option over ranking all the candidates by hand (Kumar and Prasad, 
2004, 322).  
Fiji’s communal voting restrictions create inconsistency in how vital preferences 
are. In the 19 Indian seats, preferential voting has not been needed a single time. Instead, 
an ostensibly two party race between the FLP and the NFP takes place through, in effect, 
first-past-the-post methods (Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 320). In the Fijian and Open seats, 
preferences have played a major role in determining winners. Kumar and Prasad’s 
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probabilistic analysis of the 1999 and 2001 races shows that the 1999 election was more 
“elastic,” in the sense that small changes in preference exchanges had larger implications 
for the results when compared to 2001 (Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 326). Countering the 
many arguments of Fraenkel, Grofman, and Stockwell, the authors demonstrate the 
important fact that preference sharing does not benefit any particular party and instead is 
dependent on the constellation of parties, their shares of the primary vote, and their 
ability to form viable alliances.  
In 1999, the FLP succeeded in forging strategically viable alliances at the expense 
of the incumbent SVT. In making deals with ethnic Fijian parties in the western part of 
the nation, a region typically marginalized politically at the expense of the eastern areas, 
the FLP found valuable ways to pool its vote share. This deal between the FLP, PANU, 
and the FAP has been derisively called a “coalition of convenience,” but it still 
strategically made sense as a trio of parties each looking to outmaneuver the SVT 
(Fraenkel, 2001, 16). Conversely, the SVT struggled mightily in its attempts to capitalize 
on the preferential voting model. Already in parliamentary partnership with the NFP, the 
SVT-NFP-UGP grouping looked like a sure fire winner in 1999. However, the parties’ 
decision to not compete against each other in most of the Open seats essentially negated 
any of the benefits of vote pooling from AV. The NFP and SVT’s major vote strongholds 
in the Indian and Fijian areas were of no use to the other party, because they did not stand 
a chance in a cross-ethnic constituency. The differences between the FLP and SVT’s 




 In 2001, the SDL demonstrated that alliances are not actually necessary to win a 
preference-based election. The SDL added to its share of first preferences with transfers 
from fellow Fijian parties. New regional Fijian parties undercut the vote shares of the 
western Fijian parties that had experienced success in partnership with the FLP in 1999. 
The new western parties, in addition to other radical Fijian groups, gave the SDL their 
preferences above the FLP. This does not mean that the SDL received second 
preferences; often, the results in a district came down to which party was placed last 
versus second to last on the ballots. The potential detrimental effects for being the most 
disliked party also played a role in 1999, as the Fijian VLV placed the FLP slightly above 
the SVT (Fraenkel, 2001). 
 Three factors coalesced as the defining features of Fiji’s preferential voting 
experience. First, the party system stabilized from a multiparty amalgamation of 
midsized, provincial groups to a two party race. Second, racial politics continued to play 
a major role in how parties competed and identified. Finally, Fiji’s parties learned which 
strategic behaviors were most effective. Alliances allowed crucial vote-pooling and 
proved vital in multiethnic regions with several viable party options. Cooperation in this 
electoral arena was rewarded through the distribution of preferences, giving cooperative 
parties a greater chance of maintaining initial leads and overcoming deficits from the first 
count. However, without a strong initial share of the vote, or in the face of such 
conditions, preference deals were far less useful. Additionally, cooperation does not 
automatically equate with moderation, even in a multi-ethnic partnership. The experience 
of the FLP in 1999 demonstrates that cooperation can come from a variety of purposes, 
including a pure desire to oust the incumbent regardless of ethnic orientation. Finally, 
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without legitimate third parties, preferences will rarely be used at all. As the party system 









Chapter Four: Papua New Guinea 
 
 Papua New Guinea (PNG) is the largest of the Oceanic states both geographically 
and demographically. The approximately seven million citizens occupy the eastern half 
of the massive island of New Guinea in the southwest Pacific, in addition to several 
island chains off the coast. Papua New Guinea’s ethnic fragmentation is unparalleled. 
Over eight hundred languages are spoken; indeed, the island’s hundreds of linguistic and 
cultural niches have made national identity elusive, regionalism rare, and tribal or clan 
based structures the norm.  
 Colonialism arrived late to Papua New Guinea and established only shallow roots. 
The sheer variety in Papua New Guinea’s human population combined with the equally 
imposing geographic terrain to deter entrenched colonial rule. While the Dutch nominally 
controlled the western half of the island, now the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya, the 
British and Germans split the eastern side that would later become the Papua New 
Guinean state. Australians played a major role in the British presence and took over the 
German portion of the island after World War I. For all intents and purposes, the era of 
Australian control over Papua New Guinea began in the 1920s and continued until 
independence. For the Australians, economic development, and even that pursuit 
attempted only in coastal areas, trumped any notion of political evolution in Papua New 
Guinea (Bennett, 1994).  
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 After World War II, Australia’s administration attempted to extend its control into 
the remote highlands and offshore islands regions. Australian policy discouraged native 
Papua New Guinean political development through a top-down bureaucratic structure that 
kept power in the hands of Australians in the capital and expatriate hub, Port Moresby 
(Wesley-Smith, 1994). Australian leaders remained set against Papua New Guinea’s 
independence until the late 1960s, when a wave of international criticism initiated a 
backlash against further colonial rule among the members of the Australian Labor Party. 
A rather rapid decolonization process began in 1971, after both Australian parties agreed 
on the need to transfer power. Papua New Guinea became fully independent in 1975 with 
a unicameral parliament. The Pangu Pati, headed by perhaps the most vocal champion of 
full independence, Michael Somare, won the most seats in the inaugural election 
(Wesley-Smith, 1994).  
As of the 2012 election, Papua New Guinea’s parliament contains 111 seats. 22 of 
the seats are labeled Provincial, the equivalent of a governor. The remaining 89 seats are 
Open districts. Each Provincial district is subdivided into multiple Open constituencies, 
meaning that PNG voters vote in one Open seat and one larger Provincial seat.  
 Papua New Guinea’s democratic path has baffled many experts. The nation has 
sustained parliamentary democracy with relative ease while simultaneously proving 
remarkably unstable politically (Okole, 2005). Statistically, Papua New Guinean politics 
resembles countries that use proportional representation, despite having used only 
pluralist and majoritarian rules. Ben Reilly has summarized the conditions in the nation 
thusly: “a fragmented multi-party system, coalition governments, low levels of executive 
durability and high levels of participation in terms of both voter turnout and candidacy 
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levels” (Reilly, 1997A, 8). From 1975 to 2002, Prime Ministers averaged 29 months in 
office, with no-confidence votes frequent and often successful (Reilly, 2006A, 192). 
Harsh realities underscore the poor quality of PNG democracy. Electoral violence has 
been frequent, voting often occurs in tribal blocs, and corruption and fraud is common 
(Reilly, 1997A, 8).  
 Papua New Guinea’s political culture defies many famous theories. As Henry 
Okole has argued, Duverger’s Law simply does not apply to PNG. Despite a pluralist 
electoral system for much of its post-independence history, Papua New Guinea has never 
had anything remotely approaching a two-party system. In contrast to the ideas of 
Anthony Downs, Papua New Guinea voters do not appear to engage in widespread 
calculation to avoid wasted votes. Finally, Papua New Guinea’s parties do not identify on 
commonly accepted cleavages. Socio-economic, cultural-ethnic, and other distinctive 
cleavages do not divide parties ideologically or demographically (Okole, 2005).   
 More than anything else, PNG parties revolve around their individual leaders. 
Okole succinctly states, “an attractive personality is the ultimate qualification for party 
endorsement” (Okole, 2005, 371). Like most Melanesian cultures, Papua New Guinean 
clans are based on dominant, socially mobile individuals. One way to prove one’s worth 
is through achievements that benefit one’s group. In the wantok system, an entanglement 
of reciprocity and exchange links the people of an area together. Burgeoning elites, so-
called “bigmen,” can prove their status by passing benefits to their clan. Naturally, this 
social custom transitions well to politicians running for office: bloc voting provides the 
politician with a benefit, which can be repaid through government services and kickbacks 
(Okole, 2005, 374).  
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 Ideology is rare in Papua New Guinea politics. Parties serve as a loose umbrella 
over an assortment of candidates, without many overarching commitments to one style of 
governing or set of policies. Parties link with voters through individuals, not ideas or 
concepts (Okole, 2005). This is not to say that parties do not evolve or take stands on 
issues. Alphonse Gelu’s analysis of eight parties that chose to publicly outline their views 
prior to the 2007 election demonstrates a range of economic, agricultural, and foreign 
policy attitudes. That said, the vast majority of parties chose not to outline any policies 
(Gelu, 2011). 
LPV in Papua New Guinea 
 Starting in the 1990s, Papua New Guinean ministers became increasingly 
concerned with the low levels of votes won by winning candidates. As candidate 
proliferation proceeded unabated, winning thresholds under PNG’s post-independence 
first past the post system (FPTP) frequently dipped below twenty percent (Standish, 
2006, 197). As a result, under FPTP, candidates had little incentive to campaign outside 
of their clan. Attempts to do so frequently met with violence (Reilly, 1997A). Electoral 
competition threatened to descend to a simple two-part strategy of maximizing one’s clan 
vote while suppressing others. To fix these issues, Prime Minister Mekere Morauta 
(1999-2002) initiated the Constitutional Development Commission. The Commission’s 
report led to the adoption of the Limited Preferential Vote system.  
 Limited Preferential Voting is virtually identical to the Australian Alternative 
Vote. The only difference is that, under LPV, voters only rank their top three candidates. 
Voting occurs in single-member districts and a majority of the vote guarantees election. 
Under LPV, a majority of the total vote will not necessarily be achieved. Ballots that 
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have been redistributed twice, and therefore have no other candidate marked, are 
considered “exhausted”. This reduces the total number of votes necessary to win election. 
Winning candidates, therefore, earn a majority of the non-exhausted, or “live” ballots, 
which can change throughout the counting process. The LPV system went into effect 
following the 2002 election, won by Michael Somare, and has been used in two 
subsequent national elections.  
 Experts believed that LPV would have multiple beneficial consequences. First, 
winning candidates would enjoy broader popular support through the redistribution of 
ballots and the pursuit of preferences. Second, all candidates would benefit from second 
and third preferences earned outside of their own clan group, thereby encouraging 
campaigning outside of one’s home base. Finally, there were predictions of greater 
moderation and a decrease in violence; politicians would need to reciprocate with each 
other for preference transfers and would have less reason for engaging in or sponsoring 
hostilities (Reilly, 2006A, 188). These predictions were not purely speculative. Papua 
New Guinea had previously used preferential voting in its last pre-independence election 
in 1972 prior to the transfer of authority from Australian control. The brief experiment 
saw more accommodative behavior and less violence than subsequent elections under 
FPTP (Reilly, 1997A).  
 In 2001, the Constitutional Development Commission also instituted a law aimed 
at better controlling the behavior of PNG’s parties and elected politicians. The Organic 
Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (commonly referred to as 
OLIPPAC) sought to reign in the proliferation of political parties by requiring parties to 
draft constitutions, hold internal competition for leadership, and sustain financial 
 
 88 
accountability. In exchange, registered parties received national funding each year. The 
authors envisioned better functioning and more sustainable parties as a result.  
OLIPPAC also targeted the behavior of individual politicians. Elected politicians 
faced restrictions after gaining office. MPs had to vote with their party during key votes, 
or face by-elections. It was expected that the OLIPPAC laws would both promote party 
cohesion and encourage independent candidates to join parties (Gelu, 2011). The goal 
was to combat the so-called “yo-yo” politics common in PNG, in which politicians 
changed parties frequently and seemingly without consequence.  
 Initial reactions to the reforms have been mixed. Despite the goal of decreasing 
parties through legal restrictions, OLIPPAC seems to have actually encouraged party 
formation through its financial rewards. A record 43 parties contested the election in 
2002, the first under OLIPPAC (Okole, 2005, 369). Once the 2002 election concluded 
and the new LPV reforms went into place, it became difficult to separate the impact of 
the two reforms. Most analyses have looked at LPV and OLIPPAC as two parts of the 
same set of changes.  
Ben Reilly and Bill Standish examined six by-elections that took place between 
2003 and 2004. Reilly tentatively concluded that LPV had been successful in drastically 
improving winning vote shares. Furthermore, Reilly viewed OLIPPAC as responsible for 
a reduction in the number of registered parties, down to 15. He similarly credited 
OLIPPAC with the decision of a majority of victorious independents to join parties after 
the 2002 election (Reilly, 2006A). Standish was a little more hesitant in his evaluation of 
the by-elections. While the elections were peaceful, Standish cautioned that the economic 
input and international manpower directed towards security could not be replicated in a 
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general election (Standish, 2006). Additionally, Standish ascribed the reduction in 
candidates to the normal decrease in interest and lessened financial capacity for by-
elections versus general ones (Standish, 2006, 201). Most strangely, very few politicians 
and parties in the 2003-2004 by-elections reported any change in their strategy or 
behavior under the new rules. These two evaluations were both made with a great deal of 
caution due to the miniscule sample size. More positively, Alphonse Gelu’s evaluation of 
the 2007 election, the first general vote under the LPV system, reported lowered 
campaign intensity, greater moderation, and more geographically widespread candidate 
traveling (Gelu, 2011, 115).  
The 2007 Election 
Results 
Reigning Prime Minister Michael Somare entered the 2007 election on an 
unprecedented streak. His National Alliance Party had won the most seats, 19, in the 
2002 election, which enabled him by law to be Prime Minister. Since forming 
government following the 2002 election, Somare had become the first Papua New 
Guinean to preside over a government that served its full term of five years.  
 Somare’s National Alliance Party sponsored the most candidates in the 2007 
election, 91. The National Alliance’s main rivals were expected to be the Pangu Pati, 
Somare’s original post-independence organization, the New Generation Party, formed by 
cabinet minister Bart Philemon after his expulsion from the National Alliance following 
clashes with Somare in early 2007, the PNG Party, the People’s Party, the People’s 
Progress Party, and the People’s Labour Party. 
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 In all, 21 parties won seats in the 109-member Parliament. The National Alliance 
dominated the other parties, winning 26, more than three times as many as the next 
highest seat-winner, the PNG Party. Pangu Pati and the New Generation Party won only 
five seats each. A full breakdown of the results is presented in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 Results By Party 2007 
Party Number of 
Candidates 
Seats Won 
National Alliance 91 26 
Independents 1,478 20 
PNG Party 61 8 
People’s Action Party 48 6 
Pangu Pati 84 5 
United Resources Party 25 5 
People’s Democratic Movement 54 5 
New Generation Party 90 5 
People’s National Congress Party 51 4 
People’s Progress Party 72 4 
Rural Development Party 56 4 
People’s Party 67 3 
PNG Country Party 41 2 
People’s Labour Party 46 2 
United Party 45 2 
Melanesian Liberal Party 17 2 
PNG Labour Party 14 1 
PNG National Party 49 1 
People’s First Party 23 1 
Melanesian Alliance 23 1 
PNG Conservative Party 59 1 
National Advance Party 47 1 
Others 216 0 
 
Alliances  
Formal alliances were lacking in 2007. Most publicly, the two prime rivals to the 
National Alliance, the PNG Party and the New Generation Party, announced their 
intention to form a coalition of like-minded parties. Similarly, the National Alliance and 
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its incumbent coalition partners made pledges to continue working together after the 
election (Gelu, 2011, 116). Importantly, there was little to no formal commitment to 
exchanging preferences in the election. Party cooperation focused on post-election 
arrangements, and while pre-election commonalities could theoretically be implied, there 
were no actual arrangements or efforts to systematically communicate to party supporters 
how to fill out their ballots. Therefore, in the sense of this analysis of pre-electoral 
alliances on preference transfers, there were no formal alliances in 2007.  
Party System Institutionalization 
The 2007 election featured an abundance of parties and independents. To measure 
stability in party supply, Table 4.2 divides the 34 parties that contested seats in 2007 by 
size. While 34 parties represented a decrease from the 43 parties in 2002, the total 
number of candidates reached a record high at over 2,700. No truly national parties, in the 
sense of uniform competition in all seats, existed. However, 6 parties contested at least 
60% of the seats and 16 contested more than 40%.  




Table 4.2—Party and Candidate Data 2007 
Total Number of Parties Average number of candidates per district 
34 25.3 
 
 It is difficult to assess volatility in Papua New Guinea. While incumbents were 
reelected in 37.6% of the seats, this figure should be viewed with caution because it 
requires comparing the results of the 2007 election under LPV with the 2002 election 
under FPTP. Furthermore, it is impossible to measure volatility for the election for two 
reasons: first, accurate data on each party’s percentage of the total vote is unavailable, 
and second, comparisons with the pre-LPV system lose equivalency. Again, 21 parties 
won representation in the Parliament. The extreme multiparty nature of Papua New 
Guinea is evident in the Laakso-Taagepera Index for effective number of political parties, 
12.41 for 2007. Calculating the Laakso-Taagepera Index after accounting for the switches 
in parties leads to a severe decrease in the effective number of parliamentary parties, 
down to 6.59. This reflects the voting power of the National Alliance with 38 of the 109 
members. Because the 2007 election took place under the LPV system for the first time, 
the number of Exiting Parties and Entering Parties, and their respective performances, has 
been omitted. 
High degrees of personalistic elite behavior places Papua New Guinea at the 
extreme low end of the rootedness dimension.   In 2007, over half of the candidates were 
independents. Twenty of those independents won office, representing 18.3% of the 
makeup of parliament. This is enough to make independents the second largest faction, 
obviously paradoxically, in the government. However, the OLIPPAC laws enable 
independents to join parties before the choosing of a Prime Minister. The National 
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Alliance engaged in a systematic attempt to acquire elected independents following the 
election. To increase their own power in government, the National Alliance offered 
positions to independents (Gelu, 2011, 124). 17 independents joined parties following the 
election, with 12 of those becoming members of the National Alliance. In total, 20 MPs 
switched parties within a year of the 2007 election.21  






















1,478 13.56 20 4 20 
 
Mechanics  
Unsurprisingly given the sheer number of candidates in each seat, ranging from 7 
to 69 in single constituencies, outright majority victories were rare. The average first 
preference share of the vote for winning candidates was only 21.9%, in line with pre-LPV 
numbers (Reilly, 2006A). Through LPV’s distributive mechanics, winning vote shares 
increase through the preference process. There are two ways to measure this: through the 
percentage of votes the winners received in proportion to the live ballots (a denominator 
which decreases as ballots are exhausted), or to the percentage of votes the winners 
received in proportion to the total number of ballots (a fixed denominator)—including 
those that have been exhausted. For 2007, initial first preference rankings for the average 
victor were 21.9%. The percentage of votes, including transferred preferences, out of all 
                                                
21 The other 3 switches came from party mergers: the PNG Country Party merged into the 
Pangu Pati (2 switches), and the National Advance Party merged into the People’s Action 
Party (1 switch).  
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ballots was 32.8%. The percentage of live ballots for winners at the time of declaration 
was 54.6%.22  
Only four constituencies declared immediate winners on first preference counts. 
The vast majority, 96.3%, required the counting of preferences at least once. In 25 of the 
races, the initial winner came from behind through the exchange of preferences. Table 4.5 
examines the extent to which some of the major parties benefited, or suffered, from the 
LPV system.  No party consistently outperformed the others through preference transfers. 
All of the major parties had a net change of 1 or 0 when considering the difference 
between Leads Lost and Gaps Overcome. 











in 2nd or worse 
after first 
count24 






                                                
22 Calculations made using unofficial data, mostly from the Papua New Guinea Electoral 
Commission, presented in the National Research Institute’s Election 2007: The shift to 
Limited Preferential Voting in Papua New Guinea, edited by R.J. May, Ray Anere, 
Nicole Haley, and Katherine Wheen, 2011.  
 
23 This number was calculated using only 104 constituencies due to lack of available data 
in 5.  
 
24 One constituency’s information is unavailable, so the true number could be 25/105 
(23.8%) or 26/105 (24.8%). 
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Table 4.5—Preference Success by Party 2007 












26 2 20 4 4 
PNG Party 8 0 5 2 3 
People’s 
Action Party 
6 0 5 0 1 




5 0 3-4 1 1-2 
People’s 
Party 
3 0 3 1 0 
 
 After the election, the National Alliance, now up to 38 members following the 
addition of the independents, formed a coalition government with thirteen other parties in 
support (Gelu, 2011, 124). Somare led the National Alliance and its partners relatively 
smoothly until July of 2010. At that point, twenty members of the National Alliance 
coalition, mostly members of the National Alliance itself, crossed the floor to join the 
opposition. This defection followed a Supreme Court ruling that struck down OLIPPAC’s 
laws preventing MPs from switching parties while in office. Somare avoided potential 
disaster by dismissing Parliament for several months, a tactic he had used previously 
(May, 2013).  
Unable to muster the numbers to pass a no-confidence vote at the time, the 
opposition tried again in 2011. In August, Somare remained on an extended absence in 
preparation for heart surgery in Singapore. Further uprising against Somare, in absentia, 
culminated in the Parliament declaring the position of Prime Minister vacant. Peter 
                                                
25 Full information not available for one of the NGP’s seats, therefore the ways in which 
the NGP won its 5 seats are presented as ranges.  
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O’Neill, the head of the People’s National Congress, became Prime Minister after a 
parliamentary vote. A subsequent Supreme Court decision annulled Parliament’s actions 
and legally reinstated Somare as Prime Minister. Despite this, much of the international 
community and the majority of Papua New Guinean institutions recognized O’Neill and 
his deputy, former NA member Belden Namah, as the leaders of the acting government. 
The events marked the only unconstitutional transfer of power in PNG’s history. Until the 
2012 election, PNG had its own Great Schism, with two claimants to the Prime 
Minister’s position.  
The 2012 Election 
Results 
The 2012 Election further cemented the decline of the National Alliance. The 
party won only eight seats, tied for third most in the elected government. The major 
winner was Peter O’Neill’s People’s National Congress Party, which increased its seats 
dramatically to 26.26 The new Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party won the second 
most seats with 12. In total, 21 parties won seats in the now 111-member Parliament. 
Incidents of bribery, fraud, and corruption were still reported, although by and large the 






                                                
26 The PNC Party’s victory in the Kairuku-Hiri Open seat was declared void after bribery 
allegations were confirmed. The seat remains open. Therefore, all relevant analysis uses 
110 results rather than 111.  
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Table 4.6—Results by Party 2012 
Party Number of Candidates Seats Won 
People’s National Congress Party 89 26 
Independents 2,194 14 
Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party 72 12 
PNG Party 90 8 
National Alliance Party 76 8 
United Resources Party 48 7 
People’s Party 50 6 
People’s Progress Party 40 5 
People’s United Assembly Party 29 3 
Social Democratic Party 40 3 
Melanesian Liberal Party 5 2 
New Generation Party 27 2 
People’s Movement for Change Party 51 2 
Coalition for Reform Party 15 2 
People’s Democratic Movement 19 2 
PNG Country Party 46 2 
PNG Constitutional Democratic Party 39 1 
Our Development Party 22 1 
Indigenous People’s Party 44 1 
United Party 20 1 
Pangu Pati 60 1 
Stars Alliance Party 22 1 
Others 343 0 
 
Alliances  
Heading into the election period, it appeared as if O’Neill and Namah’s close 
work in removing Michael Somare from office would facilitate preference transfers 
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between the People’s National Congress and the PNG Party. However, a feud between 
the two leaders over the timing of the election, the condition of the electoral rolls, and the 
presence of Australian advisers created a massive rift between the two parties. It is 
unclear if any preference transfers actually took place, and Namah ended up leading the 
opposition to O’Neill’s government after the election.  
Party System Institutionalization 
The spectrum of parties shifted again in 2012. 42 parties contested seats, a jump 
up from 2007 and a return to 2002’s record levels. The increase in parties was matched 
by an increase in overall candidates, with 3,443 registered candidates for the election. 
Table 3.8 separates the parties by size. Once again, no party contested more than 85% of 
the seats. The People’s National Congress and the PNG Party were the largest two 
parties, with 90 and 89 candidates respectively. The Triumph Heritage Empowerment 
Party and the National Alliance followed in size, with the middle tier including the 
declining Pangu Pati, the revived PNG Country Party, the People’s Movement for 
Change Party, the People’s Party, and the United Resources Party. Of the 43 parties, 33 
contested in less than 40% of the districts. This represents a shift towards more small 











Figure 4.2—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 2012 
 
 
Table 4.7—Party and Candidate Data 2012 
Total Number 
of Parties 







42 31.0 16 8 
  
 Incoming parties were numerous and successful in 2012. Almost 40% of the 
parties in the election were new in 2012, with those parties able to secure 22 seats. The 
Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party, whose leader, Don Polye, had previously been a 
cabinet minister and member of the National Alliance, won more than half of the entering 
parties’ seats.  
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 We can now consider some aspects of volatility in the PNG context because of 
sequential LPV elections. From 2007-2012, the incumbency reelection rate was 38.7%. 
We still cannot examine Pedersen’s Index of Electoral Volatility, however, because of a 
lack of data on the percentage of the overall vote earned by each party. The 21 parties in 
government produced a Laakso-Taagepera Index of 10.10 effective parties, which 
decreases to 6.85 if one considers post-electoral party switches.27 
Table 4.9—Volatility 








10.10 38.7% N/A 
 
Personalistic elite behavior continued unabated in 2012. Candidacy numbers grew 
by close to 700. This growth rate can be attributed largely to independents, who 
represented 63.7% of the overall registered contestants. Fourteen of the independents 
won elections, more than all but the People’s National Congress Party. Following the 
shakeup in the National Alliance, many incumbents changed parties. 29 of these 
incumbents won reelection with their new parties, many with the People’s National 
Congress, Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party, and PNG Party.28 As of the time of 
                                                
27 To calculate the modified L-T index, I used the party list of June 2013, provided by the 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission.  
 
28 Of the 29 incumbents who changed parties, 12 were from the National Alliance, two 
each from New Generation Party, PNG Party, the defunct People’s Action Party, the 
United Resources Party, and former independents, one each from People’s Democratic 
Movement, the National Conservative Party, the United Party, People’s Progress Party, 
Rural Development Party, PNG Conservative Party, and Pangu Pati. The 29 gains are 
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this writing, approximately eleven months from the election of 2012, thirteen MPs have 
switched parties, including eight independents adding an affiliation. 


















one year of 
election29 
2,194 19.77 14 29 13 
 
Mechanics 
LPV again came into play in almost every constituency in 2012. Candidates won 
only four of the seats outright without preferences, leaving over 96% of the seats to be 
determined using preferences. Unfortunately, as of the time of writing, a breakdown of 
which races candidates initially in first won and which races candidates won after 
initially trailing is not available.  











Winner initially in 
2nd or worse after 
first count 
4/111 (3.6%) 107/111  (96.4%) N/A N/A 
 
                                                                                                                                            
summarized as follows: People’s National Congress Party 11, PNG Party 5, Triumph 
Heritage Empowerment Party 5, United Resources Party 2, Our Development Party 1, 
People’s United Assembly Party 1, National Alliance 1, People’s Party 1, Social 
Democratic Party 1, and 1 independent.  
 
29 Source: Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission. 3 June 2013. 
Provided by Norm Kelly, Australian National University.  
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 Following the election, Peter O’Neill’s People’s National Congress formed a 
coalition government with twelve other parties, particularly the second place finisher 
Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party. Michael Somare, amazingly, also joined the 
coalition of his previously bitter rival. The PNG Party, led by a now anti-O’Neill Namah, 
headed the opposition.  
 
Discussion 
 The party system in Papua New Guinea is on the extreme low end of the spectrum 
of institutionalization. Party supply is unstable, personalistic elite behavior is rampant, 
and electoral results are volatile. According to Henry Okole, Papua New Guinea lacks the 
key components that produce institutionalized party systems: there is no tradition of 
cleavage-based parties and no history of political groups existing outside of the current 
Parliament. Additionally, high degrees of personalism negate party coherence (Okole 
2005, 372-376). These features produced a highly fractionalized party system revolving 
around clan-based parties and the economic and social capital of elites. While Okole’s 
analysis pre-dates the introduction of the LPV system, it establishes the beginning point 
for tracing the trajectory of PNG’s party system over the course of the last decade. 
Knowing that LPV and the OLIPPAC integrity laws were introduced specifically to boost 
Papua New Guinea’s party system, we can make initial observations on new trends and 
lingering legacies.  
 Overall, the institutional reforms of LPV and OLIPPAC have coincided with a 
slight decrease in the stability of the party supply at the parliamentary level. The number 
of candidates has not been brought down under the new rules. Between 2002 and 2007, 
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the number of registered candidates dipped very slightly from 2,878 to 2,759. That drop 
was short-lived, as the 2012 election saw a record 3,443 candidates despite only a two-
member increase in the size of the legislature. Candidate numbers have not always been 
this high in post-independence Papua New Guinea. The two elections in the 1970s 
featured less than ten candidates per electorate on average, with the median only passing 
15 in 1992 (Reilly 1997A, 11).  The recent candidature totals follow the changes in party 
supply: 42 parties in 2002 and 2012, both under OLIPPAC laws but only the latter under 
LPV, with a dip to 34 in 2007. Alphonse Gelu points out that OLIPPAC has not 
prevented candidates from forming new parties, typically but not exclusively small ones, 
after being expelled from others (Gelu, 2011, 125). The plethora of parties is also a 
relatively recent phenomenon and is likely due to OLIPPAC’s funding for legally 
registered organizations. No election prior to 2002 had more than 14 parties.  
 The lack of detailed information makes assessments of volatility for the most 
recent elections difficult. In terms of parliamentary representation, the effective number 
of political parties has dropped each election: from an all-time high of 16.16 in 2002, to 
12.41 in 2007, and finally to 10.10 in 2012.30 However, we do know that incumbent 
reelection rates have increased from the last non-LPV election, when only 25% of MPs 
were reelected between 1997 and 2002. Between 2002 and 2007 the number rose to 
37.6%, and increased slightly again to 38.7% in 2012. These numbers are closer to the 
reelection rates from the 1970s and 1980s, prior to the proliferation of parties at their 
current extreme levels (Okole, 2005, 370; Fraenkel, 2004, 122-123).  
                                                
30 2002 data from Henry Okole, 2005, 369.  
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Parties continue to have only tentative links to small groups of supporters (Gelu, 
2011). This leads to high vacillations between elections. If we measure the volatility for 
parties’ seat share between 2007 and 2012, the only two elections under LPV, we see that 
54.3% of the seats in Parliament changed hands.31 Some of this volatility may 
theoretically be a result of different voters participating in the two elections. Recorded 
participation for 2012 was over 3.67 million voters, or 76.9% of registered voters.32 In 
Papua New Guinea, registration is compulsory but voting is not.  
 OLIPPAC reforms were intended to decrease the amount of personalistic elite 
behavior in Papua New Guinea. Financial rewards would theoretically encourage 
independents to seek party membership, while limits on MP behavior would keep elected 
officials from switching parties or voting against their party once elected. In the first 
election under OLIPPAC, but before LPV, 18 independents were elected. The number 
increased to 20 in 2007 under LPV, and subsequently dropped to 14 in the most recent 
contest. Large numbers of independents have joined parties after the recent elections. As 
a consequence, PNG experiences contrasting pulls in this dimension: fewer independent 
victors, after the election itself, but more party switching behavior (Reilly, 2006A). 
Similarly, the number of actual parties in Parliament has decreased following 
consolidation of parties immediately after elections, decreasing the rootedness 
measurements dimension while also decreasing volatility.   
                                                
31 To calculate this number, I took the sum of the difference in percentage of seats won 
for each party, then divided by two to reflect the fact that one party’s gain was another 
party’s loss. Independents were omitted. If one compares the 2012 election results to the 
post-switching period after 2007, the index decreases to 46.4. 
 
32 Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, 2012. “Election Guide: 
Papua New Guinea.”  
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It is clear that Papua New Guinea’s party system is low on any measurement of 
institutionalization. The second element of the elections under consideration was the role 
of preference transfers. Paradoxically, preference transfers are ubiquitous in Papua New 
Guinea, while preference trading alliances are rare, if extant at all. Bill Standish cautions 
that new party behavior requires a period of learning. Examining the first by-elections 
under LPV’s preference trading mechanisms, he reports that most candidates did not 
change their behavior from FPTP campaigns (Standish, 2006, 198). On the party scale, 
this failure to pursue formal alliances continued in the 2007 and 2012 elections. Instead, 
the major parties formed partnerships and waged battles on post-electoral lines.  
 This is not to insinuate there was no strategy under the LPV elections. Even prior 
to 2007’s national election, some candidates understood the benefits of using preferences 
to block rivals and favor local allies. Other candidates encouraged supporters to direct 
second preferences to candidates who stood little realistic shot of winning, basically 
wasting votes and lowering the overall percentage of live votes (Standish, 2006, 200-
203).  This tactic has little grounding in mathematical logic, as it theoretically only delays 
an inevitable showdown between major candidates. Nevertheless, candidates were 
responding to the new system.  
 The most collaborative decision made at the party level was to not contest the 
same seats as incumbent coalition partners. In 2007, the reigning Prime Minister, Michael 
Somare, ran in his home regional seat without any other candidates from the National 
Assembly’s ruling coalition (Gelu, 2011, 117). This is definitely a cooperative tactic, but 
does not utilize the features of LPV in any way. In fact, seat-sharing tactics resemble 
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FPTP incentives more than preferential voting strategies, which should theoretically 
encourage like-minded parties to compete against each other with little vote-splitting risk.  
 To conclude, Papua New Guinea has a noticeable lack of formalized preference 
trading, despite massive incentives for parties to gain small advantages. The party system 
in Papua New Guinea is not institutionalized. Instability, volatility, and personalistic elite 
behavior characterize the party dynamic. The final chapter will bring the results from all 
three countries together in an attempt to theorize why Papua New Guinea parties behave 








Chapter Five: Preference Dynamics--How Party System Institutionalization Affects 
Alliance Formation 
 
The countries in the sample have selected preference voting for different 
purposes. Australia originally pursued the Alternative Vote as a way of providing for 
parties on the same side of the ideological spectrum to compete and function 
independently without harming their chances to win in a single-member district. Fijian 
legislators adopted the Alternative Vote to incentivize collaboration among non-extremist 
parties rooted in ethnic identities. In Papua New Guinea, preferential voting enhanced the 
linkages between voters and MPs by increasing the chances that a voter had selected a 
winning candidate in some fashion. Despite the differing motivations, the preferential 
voting distribution process rewards parties across the sample with forming partnerships 
and communicating those pre-election alliances to their supporters.  
The evidence from the three case studies suggests that preference voting has had 
mixed rates of success at reaching its intended goals in the Australia, Fiji, and Papua New 
Guinea. Australia’s right-wing parties, the National Party and the Liberal Party, work 
together so closely that they essentially, and sometimes literally, function as a single unit. 
In this case, the Alternative Vote seems to have failed in preventing a two-party system. 
However, the National Party has a strong pull on Liberal policy, despite being the smaller 
of the partners. This suggests a programmatic constellation of more than two parties, 
especially when considering the ability of the left-wing Green Party to influence Labor 
decisions as well. In Fiji, multi-ethnic collaborations have not always proclaimed 
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moderate views as their dominant commonality. Especially in 1999, parties from 
different ethnic backgrounds have worked together under the basic goal of ousting the 
incumbents, rather than any larger policy coordination. Determining the effectiveness of 
the Papua New Guinean effort to enhance ties between voters and candidates is currently 
difficult without survey data. Nevertheless, the one common feature of all the preference-
voting cycles is that there are tangible benefits for parties that form pre-election alliances, 
regardless of the reason for the ties that bind the parties together. Despite this reward, 
Papua New Guinean parties have not formed formal alliances to date. The research 
presented indicates that differences in party system institutionalization play a significant 
role in blocking the pre-electoral cooperation process.  
Assessing the level of institutionalization in the party systems of the eight-
election sample requires cross-national comparisons. In keeping with the dominant 
discourse on system institutionalization, the analysis has covered three separate 
dimensions. The final chapter will begin with a review of the results for each of the 
countries across the three dimensions before summarizing the extent of party system 
institutionalization in each system. The second section examines the electoral system 
itself, to see if preferential voting functions at variance with plurality rules and if alliance 
formation proved beneficial. The third section proposes a heuristic model to tie together 
the results. In the cases under consideration, party behavior has differed despite similar 
preference voting statistical distribution and, at first glance, similar incentives. Party 
system institutionalization is a crucial intervening variable. Finally, the chapter concludes 




Reviewing Party System Institutionalization 
In the preceding chapters, three dimensions of party system institutionalization 
have been investigated: stability, volatility, and rootedness. Legitimacy, which refers to 
the strength of linkages between parties and voters, has not been considered because its 
indicators use survey research that is currently unavailable in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. 
An effort has been made to separate features of the electoral system, where all parties 
compete, versus the parliamentary system, where only winning parties can participate. 
The stability dimension refers to the party supply, with special attention paid to the sizes 
of parties and the frequency with which parties enter and exit the system. Secondly, 
volatility concerns the actual electoral results. At both the individual level and the party 
level, volatility indicators attempt to capture the consistency and predictability of 
electoral cycles. The final dimension, rootedness, reflects the degree to which politicians 
are tied to parties. Measurements evaluate the presence and success of independents as 
well as the frequency with which successful politicians change affiliations. The precise 
wording implied in the three dimensions is admittedly confusing. Table 5.1 provides a 
polarized typology for each of the dimensions. It is important to keep in mind that party 
system institutionalization exists across a spectrum and that these are extreme 
generalizations (Mainwaring, 1998).  
Table 5.1 –Typology of Party System Institutionalization 
Type of System Stability Volatility Rootedness 
















The beginning point for measuring stability is the actual number of parties in the 
system. Despite its reputation as a two-party system, Australia actually has more parties 
in each observation set than Fiji, but still considerably less than Papua New Guinea. A 
similar trend unfolds when we consider the average number of candidates per district. 
Papua New Guinea has between three and five times as many candidates on the average 
ballot as Australia, and between five and seven times as many as Fiji. These data points 
are considered together in Figure 5.1. Nevertheless, there are ways in which Australia 
distinguishes itself from the two Pacific states. If we consider the percentage of parties 
contesting 80% of the seats, in essence seeking to identify nationally competitive parties, 
Australia boasts the highest overall average over the course of the sample, with 16.3% of 
its parties contending nationally. Papua New Guinea is the lowest, with only about 5% of 
its parties meeting the admittedly arbitrary 80% threshold for national appeal. Fiji exists 
in the middle and shows great change over the 1999-2006 period. Beginning with no 
parties contesting nationwide, the Fijian system evolved to just below the Australian 
average. If the threshold is decreased to 60% of contests, Fiji actually has slightly more 










Figure 5.1—Stability of Parties and Candidates 
 
 
Figure 5.2—Number of Major Parties 
 
The data for supply stability shows the value in considering both electoral and 
parliamentary power of political parties. At first glance, Papua New Guinea’s and Fiji’s 
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systems appear relatively comparable with Australia’s when we examine the changes in 
party supply from election to election. The percentage of parties exiting and entering the 
system is actually slightly lower in PNG than Australia or Fiji. Nevertheless, when we 
account for the success of Exiting Parties and Entering Parties, a different phenomenon 
emerges that will be discussed further in the volatility section.  
Australia fits the notion of a stable party system. While there are an abundance of 
parties, the actual electoral competition revolves around a couple major contenders that 
have longevity. Papua New Guinea is on the unstable end of the spectrum with massive 
amounts of candidates competing. Few parties have truly national reach, and they do not 
dominate the election by default. Fiji is harder to categorize. Over the course of its 
experiments with AV, Fiji’s system became more and more of a two party contest 
between the Fijian SDL and the Indo-Fijian FLP. As those parties extended their reach as 
national parties, their prime ethnic rivals also increased in size while other parties 
dropped out entirely. 
Volatility 
Fiji and Papua New Guinea measure as considerably more volatile than Australia. 
In fact, Australia’s placid system is well deserving of its reputation for electoral 
consistency. Australia’s changes in supply have little influence on the results: literally 
zero seats have been won by Entering Parties and no Exiting Party has won seats in its 
ultimate election. Contrarily, Fiji’s 2001 election saw a majority of the seats won by 
Entering Parties, while no Entering Parties won seats in 2006. In Papua New Guinea, 
Entering Parties won 20% of the seats in the 2012 election. The numbers for Exiting 
Parties have been less severe.  
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Figure 5.3—Success of Parties Exiting and Parties Entering 
 
These general observations are further confirmed through the Laakso-Taagepera 
Index of the effective number of parliamentary parties in office. Far more of the parties in 
Papua New Guinea are able to exercise an influence on the parliamentary system than in 
Fiji or Australia. At the parliamentary level, Fiji and Australia function throughout the 
sample as two or three party systems, despite far more parties competing in the elections. 
Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, is far more diverse and multiple in the amount of 












Figure 5.4—Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 
 
Australian incumbents were reelected in over two-thirds of the districts, at 
minimum, in the sample.  Conversely, Papua New Guinean incumbents won reelection in 
slightly over one-third of the races considering the two electoral cycles under LPV, and 
similarly low rates previously under FPTP. In Fiji, the upheaval of the 2001 election 
following the George Speight coup, coupled with the rise of the SDL party as the 
dominant ethnic Fijian political force, distorted the findings. Despite the short turnaround 
between the 1999 and 2001 election, incumbency reelection rates for 2001 were below 
20%, but bounced back to almost half the seats in 2006. Measurements for Electoral 
Volatility, the cumulative change in vote share for all parties, show similar patterns. 
Australia’s Electoral Volatility is miniscule, below 10 on the Pedersen Index, reflecting a 
less than 10% shift in the parties’ performance. Fiji’s is quite large for the dramatic 2001 
election, but then below 15 for 2006. Papua New Guinea results by party are not 
available. An admittedly flawed substitute is to estimate volatility using the cumulative 
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change in percentage of seats won in Parliament. Under this measurement, more than half 
of the seats in PNG changed parties.33 These indicators fit the anecdotal evidence that 
elections in Papua New Guinea are exceedingly difficult to predict.  
Figure 5.5—Incumbent Reelection Percentage 
 
Figure 5.6—Electoral Volatility 
 
                                                




In terms of politician affiliation with parties, Papua New Guinea is completely 
distinct from Australia and Fiji. Less than one independent, on average, contests each 
district in Fiji and Australia, while the averages in PNG were 13.56 in 2007 and 19.77 in 
2012. Independents, not surprisingly given those numbers, are more successful in Papua 
New Guinea as well. If we measure personalistic elite behavior using the attachment of 
politicians to their parties, Papua New Guinea again presents a different picture from 
Australia and Fiji.  Incumbents changing parties, and than being reelected, were common 
in the PNG sample. Conversely, the same pattern happened only three times in each 
Fijian election and not a single time in Australia. Most noticeably, Papua New Guinean 
politicians switch parties after gaining office, highlighted by 20 “party hops” after 2007 
and 13 after 2012, while this behavior is not present in Fiji or Australia.  





Figure 5.8—Victorious Incumbents Who Changed Parties 
 
 
Figure 5.9—Elected MPs Switching Parties 
 
To conclude, we can now attempt to place each of the countries into a typology of 
party system institutionalization. Australia is at one extreme: a highly institutionalized 
system characterized by stability in parliamentary supply, albeit with electoral supply 
changes between cycles, virtually nonexistent elite behavior outside of party structures, 
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and low volatility. Fiji showed the markings of an evolving system. While the sample 
size is undoubtedly too small to make strong claims, the Fijian party system appeared to 
be trending towards more stability and less volatility after the 2001 race, while 
individualistic behavior remained rare. In most, but not all of the indicators considered, 
Fiji bares closer resemblance to Australia than Papua New Guinea. PNG is at the other 
extreme from Australia: supply is unstable in both electoral and parliamentary measures, 
personalistic elite behavior is the norm rather than the exception, and results appear 
volatile. Even in the aftermath of the OLIPPAC reforms, the Papua New Guinea party 
system is poorly institutionalized.  
Table 5.2: Typology of Cases 









Fiji (1999-2006) Medium to High 
Periods of stability 
and instability  
Medium to High 
Periods of 
volatility with 
periods of calm 
High 
Party Driven 









Reviewing the Mechanics of Preferential Voting 
 The second major task in each of the case studies was to identify the relevance of 
preferential voting in determining the winners. In addition, the performance of particular 
parties and alliances was examined to determine if some patterns of behavior proved 
more successful than others in gaining seats when preferences were used.  
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 Implicit in this approach has been the need to prove first, that preferential voting 
systems differ from first past the post elections, and second, that the behavior of parties 
can play a role in determining success or failure under preference voting. For each of the 
eight elections in the sample, the frequency of outright wins was compared to those 
requiring preference exchanges. In the case of a three-candidate contest in Fiji, this might 
be one exchange, or, on the other extreme, there could be over 60 exchanges of 
preferences in a Papua New Guinean constituency. Finally, taking only the sample of 
seats requiring preferences, the frequency with which winning candidates were able to 
overcome deficits was recorded. These occasions undoubtedly reflect the influence of 
preference voting, as the ultimate winner differed from a hypothetical equivalent race in a 
first past the post system. This is not to say that the races in which the initial leader wins 
the seat through preferences are unimportant. Parties should be just as motivated, if not 
more so, to hold on to leads rather than usurp them.  
The three countries’ elections depended on preferences to widely varying degrees. 
The trend over the course of the Australian samples was towards more and more use of 
preferences in determining winners. In the most recent election in 2010, preferences 
played a role in close to 60% of races. Historically, preferences have never been more 
significant in Australia. This finding appears to go against the belief that the Alternative 
Vote is nothing more than a majoritarian system that omits minor parties. After all, the 
Green Party and the National Party, through their alliances with the Labor Party and the 
Liberal Party respectively, influence policy at the national level. Still, overcoming 
deficits is difficult. Initial leaders lost less than 13% of the seats determined through 
preferences in each of the three elections.  
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In contrast, Fiji’s reliance on preferences decreased across the sample. From an 
even split between preferences and outright wins in its first election under AV, Fiji ended 
its preferential voting experiment with only 14% of seats relying on transfers. Similarly, 
parties appeared to improve their ability to maintain initial leads. In 1999, nearly half of 
the preference transfer seats resulted in the initial leader losing. This number decreased to 
only twenty percent in 2006.  
Papua New Guinea was the most reliant on preferences by a considerable margin. 
Over 95% of the constituencies relied on the transfer of preferences, as candidate 
proliferation contributed massively to a paucity of outright wins. In 2007, nearly a quarter 
of the seats changed hands over the course of the preference allocations. The equivalent 
number for 2012 is unfortunately unavailable at the time of writing.  
Figure 5.10—Preference Use and Gaps Overcome 
 
In Australia, party constellations proved telling in determining which parties 
benefited the most from preference transfers. The long-lasting partnership between the 
Liberal Party and the National Party is based on an electoral strategy of seat splitting. The 
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two parties, with Liberal the much larger of the two, rarely compete head to head in any 
district. They therefore do not benefit much from the preference voting strategy, unless 
they partner with another party from outside the Coalition. On the other hand, the Labor 
Party has allied consistently with the Green Party over the course of the last decade. 
While not as ideologically linked as the Coalition at the policy level in government, the 
two left-leaning parties make terrific electoral partners. Each competes in all districts, and 
the Greens have made enough of an impact on the national electorate to serve as a 
consistently sizable third party transferring votes to Labor. In close contests, the Greens 
share of the vote is typically enough to push Labor candidates to a majority, whether they 
are initially ahead or not. In the three elections, 25 Coalition candidates lost leads despite 
initially leading prior to preference transfers. Labor won 24 of those races and the Greens 
another. Conversely, Labor candidates lost only two leads over the same cycle, and the 
Coalition won only one of those seats. This is not to suggest that the Coalition’s strategy 
is foolish. With the decline of the Australian Democrats and the rise of the Greens, the 
Coalition lacks a clear external partner. As a result, its ability to win preferences has 
diminished compared to the situation in the decades following World War II, when it was 
the Labor Party that consistently lost leads (Butler, 1973).  
In Fiji, evolving constellations revealed changing strategies. In 1999, the FLP 
alliance with ethnic Fijian parties proved far more capable of utilizing preference 
transfers successfully than the incumbent SVT-NFP alliance, which consistently 
employed a seat-splitting strategy. The situation flipped in 2001, with the SDL taking on 
the role of dominant ethnic Fijian party from the SVT. The FLP had won ten seats from 
initially losing positions in 1999, but that reduced to zero in 2001. At the same time, the 
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FLP went from losing only three leads in 1999 to seven in 2001. Despite not being in an 
alliance, the SDL benefited from preference transfers from other ethnic Fijian parties, the 
opposite of what had happened to the SVT in 1999. Frequently placed just above the 
FLP, the SDL won eight seats that it initially trailed in while losing only three such races. 
In 2006, the dynamic appeared to stabilize as the nation became increasingly polarized 
between the FLP and SDL demographics. With few viable third parties to choose from, 
the FLP and SDL both entered into alliances with minor parties. Only two seats changed 
hands, both SDL leads initially. Success in Fiji does not seem any more or less contingent 
on moderation than any other rationale for cooperation. It is cooperation that benefits 
parties, not cooperation born from a particular motive.  
Turning finally to Papua New Guinea, the process of evaluating gets much 
trickier. Most obviously, there were no formal alliances. Therefore, the performance of 
all parties during the 2007 election was considered. Viewed as an alternative to the 
strategies employed in Fiji and Australia, not forming alliances appears to have rendered 
Papua New Guinean parties equally capable of losing leads and overcoming gaps. All 
things being equal, it is hard to imagine how forming alliances would not have improved 
the ability of some of the major PNG parties to hold on to leads and overcome deficits. 
The next section offers a potential explanation for how poor party system 
institutionalization could have negated the seemingly beneficial incentives to pursue 
alliances in Papua New Guinea.  
A Heuristic for Party System Institutionalization and Preference Alliances  
 In a highly institutionalized party system, forming alliances to transfer 
preferences makes perfect sense. Parties that are roughly equal in popularity envision a 
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symbiotic relationship. In a district where Party A has more supporters than Party B, it 
reliably acquires Party B votes as preferences are exchanged. Party B gets a reciprocal 
benefit in a district where it has a larger initial advantage. Taken cumulatively, both 
parties can increase their seat share in relation to parties that might have a slightly larger 
percentage of the initial vote while simultaneously maintaining leads against others that 
lag behind.  
There are also benefits for parties of unequal popularity. The more popular party 
engages in the same logic as above: transfers from its alliance partner increase its vote 
share and help it earn more seats while keeping the ones it initially leads but does not 
hold an initial majority. For the less popular party, the benefits might be purely a matter 
of policy trades; helping its partner in the election can lead to concessions after the 
formation of government. However, there are also potential electoral benefits. If the less 
popular party has a stronghold in a particular constituency, for whatever demographic 
reason, than its ability to reliably transfer small amounts of the vote in other districts to 
its partner can lead to crucial reciprocation in the few districts where it has a larger initial 
vote share. This allows small parties a chance to gain office despite lacking a majority in 
any given seat.  
These benefits are on display in Australia and, to a lesser extent, Fiji. In Australia, 
party supply among the major vote-winners is stable, results fluctuate only minimally, 
and parties exert strong control over their candidates. Preference alliances are repeated 
over the course of multiple electoral cycles. Given Australia’s extreme placidity in its 
results, it is actually not surprising that pre-election transfers tend to benefit only one 
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grouping. If the two major parties cannot earn an outright majority, the most powerful 
third party holds a decisive influence over the eventual outcome. 
In Fiji, the general trend has been towards more party system institutionalization. 
Alliance packages transformed as the strategic goals of the medium to small parties 
changed, from ousting an incumbent to more racially and ideologically aligned solidarity. 
The solidification of a two-party system drastically lowered the use of preferences, which 
became viable only in ethnically heterogeneous Open seats. Still, the strongest of the 
minor parties, like in Australia, wields influence in those races.  
 Low party system institutionalization could interfere with parties’ ability to 
calculate incentives. Simply put, it’s not clear who has the power and what the potential 
benefits are of allying with specific partners. Furthermore, in poorly institutionalized 
systems with high levels of personalistic elite behavior, there are more contending 
independents that might not be enchanted with the same rationale of reciprocity that 
applies to parties.  
 Unstable party supply could make forming alliances more difficult by obscuring 
the parties that might make natural preference transfer partners. If the size of parties 
changes dramatically in each cycle, a party on the look out for a preference deal may 
have a harder time calculating who its most valuable potential partners are. Parties that 
may have been of value as partners in specific districts given the results of previous 
elections may opt not to pose candidates in those districts in subsequent cycles. Exiting 
Parties and Entering Parties can also complicate the matter. While the mere reality of 
parties coming and going is not, taken by itself, a difficult obstacle to account for, 
preference alliances become more complicated when successful parties leave the system 
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and new parties have high potential for earning seats. Calculating the demographic 
strengths and weaknesses of new parties is naturally more difficult than for established 
ones, and a vacating party leaves an equally unclear vacuum. Cumulatively, the 
indicators of unstable party supply combine to create uncertainty and inconsistency for all 
parties, making pre-electoral alliance formation less obviously fortuitous.  
 Similarly, party systems characterized by volatile results might pose challenges 
for alliance formation. Parties that cannot safely estimate their own strengths and 
weaknesses from election to election are limited in their ability to calculate strategically 
viable partnerships.  When incumbents are infrequently able to win reelection, parties 
cannot count on past areas of strength for either themselves or fellow parties that appear 
powerful in the moment. In many ways, unstable supply and high volatility work together 
to deter pre-election alliances. Both features boost the range of potential electoral 
outcomes to levels that may create risks in forming alliances that outweigh the potential 
benefits.  
 Frequent personalistic elite behavior further also could negate the advantages of 
alliance formation. When independents constitute a large and viable portion of the 
candidate list, the incentives of preference alliances likely dissipate. Independents should 
not make the multi-district calculations that are part of the logic of preference deals. For 
an unaffiliated candidate, the single member district is a zero-sum game. Obviously, 
independents would typically welcome preference deals from less popular parties or 
candidates in an effort to boost their percentage of the vote. However, they have nothing 
to offer outside of their constituency. Powerful independents cannot reciprocate with 
preferences in other districts, negating electoral benefits for their partner. Furthermore, 
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independents typically will struggle to provide policy rewards or enough voting power 
once in government at the same volume as a party. Conversely, an independent that 
makes a preference deal and ultimately helps another candidate win office cannot achieve 
any other parliamentary benefit. Their facilitation of the transfer of their own vote earns 
them little advantage.  
 Personalistic elite behavior, or an absence of rootedness, on the behalf of party 
members also could have consequences on alliance formation. When elites can operate 
freely outside the boundaries of party restrictions, changing parties frequently for 
example, parties have less control over the electoral process. In a system dominated by 
individuals rather than parties, district races can take on the zero-sum nature described 
above. When parties exist more in name than in function, the multi-district calculations of 
reciprocity could yield to individual impulses to view each race as zero-sum.  
 The potential hindrances posed by unstable supply, volatile results, and 
personalistic behavior are not chasms. Parties and independents may still seek to transfer 
votes due to ideological similarity, strong personal relations, or a common dislike of a 
particular opponent. But, the characteristics of a poorly institutionalized system should be 
expected to decrease the frequency and amount of pre-electoral alliances of a formal and 
national nature.  
 Papua New Guinea fits this model well. Preferences should benefit the dozens of 
parties that are competitive in LPV elections. Due to the inability of most candidates to 
win their races outright, preferences are used in almost all races. The proliferation of 
parties suggests initial gaps are small and could be surmounted with consistent transfers 
from a coalition of allied parties. The volatility and instability in PNG suggests that 
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dozens of parties could benefit electorally from these tactics, not just the major powers as 
in Fiji and Australia. Low party system institutionalization is perhaps the key factor in 
explaining the absence of pre-electoral alliances.  
 There is one other consideration at play in Papua New Guinea. As one of the 
indicators for personalistic elite behavior, this study considered the frequency with which 
MPs switch parties between cycles and immediately following elections. The so-called 
party hopping behavior, common to PNG historically and recently condoned once again, 
provides an alternative method for parties to gain many of the advantages presented in the 
preference voting system. Parties compete to increase their seat share through acquiring 
individuals that stand a good chance of being elected, or have been already. In this way, 
without needing to calculate alliance incentives, parties can increase their size in the 
parliament. From a strategic standpoint, party hopping is a less risky and less difficult 
proposition for parties. Table 5.3 demonstrates how party size in the government changes 
as a result of party hopping. The phenomenon helped the largest party the most, as it did 










Table 5.3—2012-2013 Party Hopping in PNG34 
Party Seats Won 
2012 
Seats Held June 201335 Change in Seats 
People’s National Congress Party 26 35 +9 
Independents 14 5 -9 
Triumph Heritage Empowerment 
Party 
12 11 -1 
PNG Party 8 6 -2 
National Alliance Party 8 9 +1 
United Resources Party 7 8 +1 
People’s Party 6 6 0 
People’s Progress Party 5 6 +1 
People’s United Assembly Party 3 3 0 
Social Democratic Party 3 2 -1 
Melanesian Liberal Party 2 1 -1 
New Generation Party 2 3 +1 
People’s Movement for Change 
Party 
2 1 -1 
Coalition for Reform Party 2 1 -1 
People’s Democratic Movement 2 3 +1 
PNG Country Party 2 2 0 
PNG Constitutional Democratic 
Party 
1 1 0 
Our Development Party 1 1 0 
Indigenous People’s Party 1 0 -1 
United Party 1 1 0 
Pangu Pati 1 0 -1 
Stars Alliance Party 1 1 0 
Others 0 0 0 
 
 
                                                
34 Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission, “List of Members of Political 
Parties by Member in Parliament,” 3 June 2013, obtained via electronic communication 
with Norm Kelly on 7 August 2013.  Calculation of the Change in Seats is my own. 
 
35 Only 106 MPs are currently sitting in PNG’s Parliament due to four results being 




Possible Limitations to the Heuristic Model 
 It is important to emphasize that the last section proposed only a heuristic model 
for evaluating the likelihood and nature of preference alliances in different party systems. 
There are multiple reasons to be cautious with the interpretation of the evidence and the 
theoretical constructs developed thus far. These limitations include both potential 
measurement error and alternative interpretations of the sample cases.  
 From a measurement perspective, small sample size limits this study. As argued 
in the first chapter, this is a necessary byproduct of having only three countries in the 
world with equivalent systems. While preferential voting is common in elections for 
European executive offices, and gaining prominence at the local level throughout the 
democratic world, it is exceedingly rare for national legislative elections. To date, only 
Australia and Papua New Guinea use the system, with Fiji likely moving away from 
preferential voting in its upcoming election after a lengthy hiatus from democratic 
procedure.36 There were only three Fijian elections to examine, one more than Papua 
New Guinea has conducted under LPV to this point. The number of observations could 
have been drastically increased using Australian contests, but that threatened to tilt the 
relative balance of having a similar number of elections from each country.   
 Beyond sample size, there is always risk in presenting observations and 
measurements from multiple countries as strict truths ripe for comparison. Most 
noticeably in this study, data for measuring the volatility dimension of party system 
institutionalization is unavailable for Papua New Guinea. Without knowing what 
                                                
36 Fiji has not held elections since 2006, but is scheduled to hold elections under a new 
constitution at some point in 2014.  
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percentage of the vote each party earned, any attempt to gauge Electoral Volatility is a 
guessing game at best. Furthermore, for the 2012 PNG election, there is no available data 
on which seats were won by candidates who were initially trailing. This hampers our 
ability to confidently state that preference transfers altered the election results. Even 
when data is available for Papua New Guinea, accusations of electoral fraud and voter 
intimidation subject the results to a degree of variance likely greater than exists in 
Australia and Fiji. When we also consider that Fiji and Australia have compulsory voting 
while Papua New Guinea does not, there is ample reason to treat Papua New Guinea 
results with caution.37 Suggesting that particular results stem solely from a vacillating 
electorate or a dominant elite threatens to bury potentially influential improprieties.  
 Fiji presents its own series of issues. First, the majority of seats are allocated by 
communal identity. The presence of exclusively Fijian and Indian districts, in 
combination with the 25 Open seats, could alter the incentives for alliances in a variety of 
ways. For example, the two major Indian parties, the NFP and the FLP, would greatly 
benefit from sharing preferences in Open seats, but are the only direct competitors in the 
Indian seats. It is hard to unpack the myriad of ways in which the institutionalization of 
racial politics in Fiji could influence stability, volatility, and the structure of alliances. 
Add to that the 2000 George Speight coup, which overthrew the elected FLP government 
and indirectly led to new elections in 2001. This event shifted the power and identity of 
the Fijian parties in ways that directly caused shifts in stability and volatility. After 
consideration, it is my argument that this non-democratic event should be included in the 
                                                
37 C. Bean argues that Australia’s short peaks and troughs in volatility result from its 
compulsory voting measures (Bean, 1986, 59-60).  
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evaluation of Fiji’s democratic system. Non-democratic behavior, and its subsequent 
consequences, has meaningful contributions on party system institutionalization that 
should not be ignored.  
 Ethnic fragmentation and linguistic variation could possibly be the ultimate 
drivers of party system institutionalization. In this study, Australia represents a unipolar 
electorate divided on a single left-right cleavage of ideology. Fiji, with an omnipresent 
divide between the indigenous population and the Indo-Fijian one, has the additional 
cleavage of ethnicity, not to mention multiple languages in which to conduct political 
affairs. Papua New Guinea is perhaps the preeminent example of multipolarity in the 
universe of democracies. While it is likely that there is correlation between ethnic 
fragmentation and levels of party system institutionalization, suggestions of causation are 
premature and underdeveloped to date. In Papua New Guinea, for example, replacing 
fluidity with fragmentation overlooks the basic fact that parties do not typically coalesce 
on common ethnic or linguistic lines. In fact, Papua New Guinea is so fragmented that 
party behavior solely on ethnic lines is practically impossible. Similarly, solely relying on 
ethnic fragmentation to contrast Fiji and Australia ignores the fact that the indigenous 
Fijian party structure has typically appeared multipolar while the Indo-Fijian has 
consistently been bipolar. This is not to dismiss ethnic fragmentation as a legitimate 
driver of party system institutionalization measurements. On the surface, the correlation 
seems likely. However, given the scope of this research project, the degree to which 
ethnic fragmentation affects party system institutionalization must be viewed as a process 
prior to the formation of the independent variable.  
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The related possibility certainly exists that it is ethnic fragmentation and linguistic 
variation, rather than fluid party system institutionalization, which inhibits pre-election 
cooperation. While future large-N studies could show that this is generally true, the Fijian 
case indicates otherwise. Whatever causal mechanism would prevent multipolar societies 
from featuring cooperative preference-trading behavior would also appear to prevent 
bipolar societies from featuring multi-ethnic alliances. After all, an alliance at its core 
features two parties, which are either of the same predominant ethnic group or not, if 
organized along ethnic lines. Yet, in each electoral cycle in Fiji, the Indo-Fijian FLP was 
able to make alliances with predominantly Fijian ethnic parties. This analysis is difficult 
to extend to Papua New Guinea for the reason previously stated: parties in PNG do not 
usually feature a single ethnic group.  
 Throughout the course of the analysis, there has been an implicit assumption that 
preferential voting and party system institutionalization exist as separate phenomena. 
However, there might be reason to believe that the dynamic is more complicated. Farrell 
and McAllister suggest that the AV system increases party discipline in Australia (Farrell 
and McAllister, 2005). Nevertheless, the causal mechanism that would link preferential 
voting with enhanced party discipline is underdeveloped, if not nonexistent. The lack of 
even remotely comparable discipline, even after the addition of the OLIPPAC reforms, in 
Papua New Guinea under the closely related LPV suggests that the relationship might not 
exist at all. Additionally, Fraenkel provides evidence that the AV system will lead to an 
increase in small parties that are tangentially related to one of the major parties (Fraenkel, 
2004, 126). However, the vast differences in the dimension measurements among the 
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three countries of the study suggest that party system institutionalization does not 
converge to a common level in preference voting cultures.  
 Three particularly intriguing caveats remain. The first relates to chronology, 
particularly in comparing the recent Australian elections with those from Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea. Australia’s 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections were the latest in an unbroken 
century-long preferential voting tradition. However, the Fijian and Papua New Guinean 
elections under examination represent nearly the entirety of the two nations’ preferential 
voting experience.38 It is likely that parties gradually learn ideal strategies for preferential 
voting systems and that behavior will change over time as a result. This learning process 
takes place through repeated democratic behavior, as suggested by Staffan Lindberg 
(Lindberg, 2006).  In this sense, Australia’s parties represent a post-learning stage of 
preference voting whereas Papua New Guinea’s parties are still learning. Fiji appears to 
provide an ideal model for this theory, as the ethnic Fijian parties changed their strategies 
and gradually achieved the success suggested by their numerical superiority.  Further 
study of the validity of this theory will have to wait for both more countries to adopt 
preferential voting and more elections to take place.  
 Second, it is possible that some of the variation in alliance strategy presented in 
this study is due primarily to ballot structure. In Australia, voters frequently take How To 
Vote cards into the polls with them. Provided by their party of choice, the HTV cards 
give a complete set of numbered preferences for a given district according to the wishes 
of that party. While voters do not have to follow these cards, they do give parties the 
                                                
38 Papua New Guinea used the Alternative Vote in its pre-independence national council 
elections in the early 1970s.  
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ability to influence their supporters in the direction of preferences in an indirect manner. 
In Fiji, the Above the Line voting method gives parties direct control over preference 
transfers. According to an order published before the actual election date, parties 
redistribute Above the Line ballots to other parties once their own candidate is 
eliminated. The vast majority of Fijian voters choose this method, giving Fijian parties 
near total power to direct preference flows. Conversely, Papua New Guinea has no such 
measures. Parties and candidates, if they have clear preference strategies, have to 
communicate those to voters in less formalized ways. It is certainly plausible that the 
introduction of How to Vote cards or Above the Line voting would increase the amount 
of alliances in Papua New Guinea. However, it is my conjecture that the low system 
institutionalization would still present major obstacles for a cross-nationally comparable 
number of parties to enter into alliances.  
 Finally, this analysis has employed a strict definition of pre-election alliances. I 
have counted as pre-election alliances only those formalized through public declarations. 
In Australia and Fiji, the formal alliances have produced higher transfers of votes to 
corresponding partners than other, not formalized, ideologically or strategically 
compatible sets of parties. Keeping in mind that all voters transfer preferences in the AV 
and LPV systems, votes shift in non-random ways regardless of alliance formation. From 
the available evidence out of Australia and Fiji, there appears to be a clear difference in 
the performance of the most successful alliances versus non-allied parties. However, 
further mathematical studies could add to the field by comparing the actual shift in votes 





 This study has examined pre-electoral party behavior in preferential voting 
systems. Two nations, Australia and Fiji, have major parties that consistently seek 
alliances with other parties in the build up to elections. A third, Papua New Guinea, has 
parties that form alliances, but only towards post-election goals. Socio-cultural 
explanations do not fit well. Fiji and Papua New Guinea have far more in common 
ethnically, demographically, economically, and historically with each other than either 
has with Australia.  
 There is no mathematical reason for Papua New Guinean parties to avoid pre-
election alliances. In fact, there is considerable evidence that preference alliances would 
be more impactful in Papua New Guinea than the other two nations due to frequency of 
use and closeness of margins. Assuming that Papua New Guinean parties have looked to 
preference voting results in Australia and Fiji, it is obvious that coordinated pre-election 
alliances can yield greater seat shares than would otherwise be the case.  
 The most convincing explanation for the discrepancy in party behavior lies in the 
institutionalization of the party systems. Australia’s highly institutionalized party system 
is reflected in consistent alliances and a relative equilibrium between the two major 
parties. Changes in which third party is most proficient can tilt the effectiveness of 
partnerships, but those shifts are rare. As a result, the alliances and the benefits are 
constant across the sample. Fiji’s party system underwent tremendous change during the 
sample. Changing Fijian parties and a military coup helped polarize the electorate behind 
two powerful parties. Polarization caused an immediate increase in volatility, but results 
stabilized after a further cycle. Fiji’s party system became grew increasingly 
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institutionalized over the course of the sample. Alliances were formed and had influence 
in each of the elections, with decreasing likelihood of seismic shifts as the two dominant 
parties emerged. Finally, Papua New Guinea’s party system is poorly institutionalized. 
The heuristic developed in this work suggests that unstable supply and high volatility 
restricts parties from accurately predicting, and therefore making, viable pre-electoral 
alliances. Vast quantities of independents contest and gain office, adding a major element 
to the electoral contest that does not operate under the same alliance-making incentives as 
parties would. Independents and party MPs consistently change affiliations, exposing 
PNG parties to changes in seats without complex and unpredictable calculations of 
alliance partnerships.  The institutionalization of the party system serves as a potentially 
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